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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
CONDUIT BOND FINANCING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS—
PERSPECTIVE FROM THE U.S. AND CHINA 
As an alternative way to issue bonds, conduit financing has been widely used by 
local governments and nonprofit organizations. Conduit financing allows one entity to 
issue debt on behalf of single or multiple borrowers. In the state of California in the U.S., 
a local agency is allowed to issue municipal bonds in compliance with law, but can also 
borrow through a joint powers agency (JPA). In this case, the JPA serves as a conduit. 
Conduit financing is preferred by local agencies in certain circumstances because it is 
more convenient or fixed issuance costs can be split between several conduit borrowers 
through bond pooling. In China, various Chinese local government issued debts through 
the local government financial vehicles (LGFV); LGFV is viewed as a conduit. Conduit 
operations, however, bring extra financial and administrative burdens. In this dissertation 
I examine borrowing costs of local governments in the U.S. and in China, particularly 
paying attention on debts issued through conduits. 
The chapter 2 provides a background context and theoretical foundation of the 
whole dissertation. In addition, two mechanisms--borrowing through JPAs in the U.S. 
and through Chinese local government funding platforms will be compared to identify the 
similarity and distinctive perspectives. Based on data from California Debt and 
Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC), the third chapter of my dissertation aims to 
probe into two issues: (1) what drives local agencies to use conduit? (2) Did conduit 
financing produce lower TIC than other revenue bonds? The emergence and existence of 
this type of conduit is profoundly historical and political.  One reason for this is 
informational asymmetry in the municipal bond market. The disclosure requirements of 
the municipal bond market are weaker than the corporate bond market, and plenty of 
small issuers are less known by municipal bond investors. Although bond pooling 
provided by conduits is supposed to lower borrowing costs, most bonds issued by JPAs 
finance a single local agency. Therefore, it is important to investigate the incentives for 
these local agencies to use conduits instead of arm’s-length investors. As a matter of fact, 
during the borrowing process, the JPA is a type of financial intermediary that can 
reorganize small issues more efficiently. Hence, sophisticated local agencies with strong 
 
 
backgrounds prefer to borrow directly from the credit market under their name. To avoid 
selection bias and potential endogeneity problems, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression will be used. My empirical results show that ceteris paribus, TICs of 
California local governments are significantly reduced through conduit financing. 
Chapter 4 focuses on Chinese local government debts issued through the local 
government financial vehicles (LGFV). Specifically, this chapter addresses two questions: 
(1) in Chinese quasi-municipal credit markets, is there any evidence that the quasi-
municipal bond market is influenced by market principles? (2) How are borrowing price, 
borrowing volume, and infrastructure expenditure interconnected? Using data from 2007 
to 2012, through a simultaneous equation model, I found that the municipal credit system 
in China has the mixed characteristics of relationship-based and market-based systems; 
and that the available fiscal resources and debt have a complementary relationship.  
To my knowledge, there are very few studies that consider drivers of debt 
financing choices of local governments and empirically examined the impact of conduit 
financing on their borrowing costs.  My research seeks to bridge this gap. Since most 
local governments have been burdened with heavy debts, understanding how the conduit 
financing fiscally influence local governments is very important. 
KEYWORDS: municipal bonds, conduit financing, subnational 
government debts,          Marks-Roos bonds, Chinese 
urban investment bonds 
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Chapter 1 Overview of Dissertation 
Introduction 
Municipal bonds have been widely used since the 1800s, playing an important 
role in fiscal management and economic development. Municipal bond financing gives 
state and local governments more resources for building infrastructure and investing in 
capital projects, makes living environments more convenient, and can potentially 
stimulate economies. The two most commonly used types of municipal bonds are the 
general obligation bond (GO bond) and the revenue bond. Most GO bonds are secured by 
the full faith and credit of the issuer, require voter approval prior to issuance, and are 
usually paid from the general funds of the issuer, depending on state or local laws. GO 
bonds usually obtain very high credit ratings and are viewed as the safest type of bond 
aside from treasury bonds. On the other hand, revenue bonds are backed and paid from a 
specific source of revenue that varies from case to case. “Pledged revenues may be 
derived from operation of the financed project, grants, or excise or other specified non-
ad-valorem taxes. Generally, no voter approval is required prior to issuance of such 
obligations.”1 Revenue bonds are more complicated than GO bonds, and their credit risks 
depend on repayment sources and the revenues specifically pledged in the contract. This 
leads to a large range of credit ratings and borrowing costs. Those investing in revenue 
bonds therefore take the risk that the pledged revenues may not be sufficiently profitable 
to repay them, as they have no legal recourse to the state’s general funds or tax revenues. 
1  The definition is from the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. For more information, see: 
http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/REVENUE-BOND.aspx 
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Thus, revenue bonds generally obtain lower credit ratings and bear higher interest costs 
than GO bonds. Local governments utilize both GO bonds and revenue bonds to finance 
public goods.    
After two hundred years of development, municipal bonds have become so 
abundant and diverse that various categories have developed, each providing different 
financing methods. Among them, local governments and nonprofit organizations have 
used conduit debt financing as an alternative to other common issuance methods. Conduit 
debt financing allows one entity to issue debt on behalf of one or multiple governments. 
The creation of conduit debt financing was intended to promote the utilization of bond 
pooling in order to reduce local borrowing costs. However, issuers are required to pay a 
substantial amount of issuance costs. Since many local governments often carry heavy 
debts, it is important to investigate whether or not conduit debt financing actually 
decreases their borrowing costs. In this dissertation, I examine conduit financing in the 
context of local governments in the U.S. and China, paying particular attention to Marks-
Roos bonds and Chinese urban investment bonds.  
This chapter will explain the motivation for the study, define the major research 
questions examined in the three chapters that follow, and describe the overall 
organization of this dissertation.   
Motivation 
Although debt financing broadens the financing channel of local governments and 
contributes to economic and social development, there is a downside: debt can be a 
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serious problem if it gets out of control. This concern about risk has been present since 
the origin of municipal bonds. State and local governments can be subject to balanced 
budget requirements, competition between comparable jurisdictions, and the influence of 
federal policies. The question of how to use municipal bonds wisely and constrain the 
level of debt within the affordability scope has been a point of considerable interest for 
public finance researchers.  
Conduit financing provides an alternative way for local governments to access 
credit markets and potentially reduces borrowing costs, but it is also a high-risk bond 
type. Investment in conduit bonds reduces significantly during financial crises, and the 
default rates of conduit bonds are higher than average municipal bonds. To my 
knowledge, there is a dearth of studies on conduit financing. This dissertation seeks to fill 
this gap, that is, to contribute research on the municipal bonds of local governments 
issued through conduits in the U.S. and through Chinese local government funding 
platforms, a similar mechanism. 
Research Question 
The broad purpose of this dissertation is to explore the role of conduit financing in 
the municipal bond market. The chapter 2 provides background, context, and the 
theoretical foundation of the whole dissertation. It includes the following main sections: 
the definition of conduits; description of types of different conduits; focus on a particular 
type of conduit financing in which a conduit agency issues bonds and passes the proceeds 
to local government. Two cases are explained in detail: Marks-Roos Bonds (MRBs) in 
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California and Chinese urban investment bonds (UIBs). I examine the motivation for 
using conduits and outline the key characteristics of conduit bonds. Furthermore, I 
analyze MRBs and UIBs in order to compare and contrast the perspectives of these two 
mechanisms.  
The third chapter of my dissertation will explore two questions: (1) what drives 
local agencies to use conduits, and (2) did conduits save money for local agencies or cost 
more? Although bond pooling provided by conduits is supposed to lower borrowing costs, 
most of the bonds issued by JPAs finance, a single local agency. It is important to 
investigate the incentives of these local agencies to use conduits instead of arm’s length 
investors, and whether or not conduit financing reduces borrowing costs. 
The forth chapter focuses on Chinese local government debts issued through local 
government financial vehicles (LGFV). Specifically, this chapter addresses two questions: 
(1) in Chinese quasi-municipal credit markets, is there any evidence that market 
principles influence the quasi-municipal bond market? (2) How are borrowing price, 
borrowing volume, and infrastructure expenditure interconnected? Using data from 2007 
to 2012 and applying a simultaneous equation model, I found that the municipal credit 
system in China has the mixed characteristics of relationship-based and market-based 
systems, and that available fiscal resources and debt have a complementary relationship. 
Apparently, due to highly different credit systems in the U.S. and China, it is reasonable 
to expect distinct credit system operations. Because of this, the mechanisms that have 
been documented in the U.S. do not necessarily work well in China. At the moment, the 
Chinese central government is arranging for the extensive use of municipal bonds. 
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Concerns about financial vehicles, including the lack of transparency and weak risk 
management practices of Chinese subnational governments, keep rising and are attracting 
attention from both scholars and practitioners. This analysis provides some evidence of 
market development status, which is the foundation of future research and policy making. 
Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of five chapters. The second chapter provides a 
definition of conduit financing, as well as an overview of background, context, and major 
features. Additionally, two mechanisms – conduit financing in the U.S. and borrowing 
through Chinese local government funding platforms – will be compared to identify the 
similarities and differences of these perspectives. In the third chapter, I test the 
hypotheses of debt financing choices and the impact of TIC through an empirical analysis 
using data from the California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC), 
which covers all municipal bonds issued by California local governments from 1984 to 
2016. In chapter four, I conduct an empirical analysis on Chinese local government debts 
issued through local government financial vehicles (LGFV), in which I apply a 
simultaneous equation model to data from 2007 to 2012. Finally, chapter five concludes 
by addressing the policy implications of my major findings. 
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Chapter 2 Conduit Financing -- What is It and How does It Work? 
Introduction 
Conduit financing, which allows one entity to issue debt on behalf of one or 
multiple governments, provides an alternative way for local governments to access credit 
markets and potentially reduces borrowing costs. But conduit operation brings additional 
financial and administrative burdens. Local governments do not have to borrow from 
conduits – joint powers agencies; rather, they can approach investors directly by issuing 
municipal bonds. Conduit financing, however, provides extra benefits that are valuable to 
local agencies.  
To my knowledge, there are only a limited number of studies on conduit financing. 
This chapter provides this dissertation’s background, context, and theoretical foundation. 
First, it reviews the definition of conduits and describes the different types of conduits; 
then, it provides an analysis of the motivation for using conduits, and describes key 
characteristics such as who is using conduits, what role do they play, and the 
responsibility of paying conduit debts. Furthermore, MRBs and UIBs are compared to 
identify the similarities and differences of the perspectives presented by these two 
mechanisms. Finally, this chapter is intended to provide an objective picture of how 
conduit financing has been used and to facilitate discussion surrounding the costs and 
benefits of using conduit financing. 
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Definition and Categories of Conduits 
The word “conduit” has various definitions and meanings. Merriam-Webster 
defines a conduit as “someone or something that is used as a way of sending something 
(such as information or money) from one place or person to another.” Conduit financing 
is when an entity sends money as a bridge between two other parties. Scholars in the 
fields of finance, economics, and public administration have all studied conduits with 
different purposes and emphases.   
In finance literature, a “conduit” refers to “a financial organization or entity 
whose business purpose is to buy loans or other financial assets from correspondents, 
with the goal of earning a profit by repackaging and selling the assets as securities (Elmer, 
1999). In other words, finance literature views a “conduit” as “a type of business that 
specializes in securitizing loans and other types of financial assets.” In general, conduits 
buy or generate loans at low prices from mortgage bankers, mortgage brokers, banks, 
thrifts, or secondary markets. They then sell them at high prices as securities to securities 
brokers and dealers, or as whole loans to secondary markets. This type of conduit has 
existed in the finance field since the early 1980s. Finance scholars believe that conduits 
are not just simple arbitrages. They also bring their expertise and bear risks.  
Economics literature studies conduit countries from a tax perspective. 
Multinational companies shift their income from high to low tax jurisdictions, and 
conduit countries are used for this purpose. Conduit countries have “both large capital 
outflows and inflows (not just one or the other). Some of these countries have special 
laws, such as bank secrecy (Switzerland and Luxembourg), a strong judicial system (the 
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United Kingdom) and corporate governance rules (Delaware in the United States) that 
encourage companies to set up holding companies in their jurisdictions (Mintz, 2004).” 
Other countries “have a tax regime that encourages investment flows through them that 
enables multinationals to substantially reduce taxable income on a worldwide basis.” 
These scholars discuss reasons of emerge, the revenue costs of governments, and 
allocation efficiency and its implications (Mintz and Smart, 2004; Andersson and Fall, 
2001; Mintz, 2004).  
In the public administration field, scholars discuss conduit financing in the form 
of private activity bonds2. A state or local governmental entity can issue private activity 
bonds and “passes the proceeds through to businesses and individuals for their private use 
in the hope of spurring economic development (Zimmerman, 1989).” The use of this form 
of conduit financing became widespread in the late 1960s and attracted the attention of 
the federal government. Since it is believed that many of the services funded by private 
activity bonds “provide minimal or no benefits to Federal taxpayers,” this financing form 
makes it so the “Federal government loses its ability to control its budget,” and considers 
“tax-exempt bonds as a substitute for taxable debt.” This shows the “inefficiency of tax 
exemption as a subsidy” and “reduce[s] the progressivity of the income tax.” Congress 
and the Treasury Department interfered with the use of private activity bonds by 
enforcing a series of laws and regulations such as the Revenue and Expenditure Control 
Act of 1968, the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1980, 
2  More information about private activity bonds please see 
http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/PRIVATE-ACTIVITY-BOND-_PAB_.aspx 
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the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987.  
An example of conduits is special purpose entities. A variety of states “special 
purpose entities” or SPEs are created as “enterprises” to run state programs as an integral 
part of state government. These types of state SPEs typically finance their operations by 
issuing revenue bonds (also called revenue debt), repayable solely from the profits of the 
enterprise. Investors in those bonds therefore take the risk that the enterprise will be 
insufficiently profitable to repay them. They generally have no legal recourse to the 
state’s general funds or tax revenues, and thus the bonds “are not considered state debt.” 
These SPE had been created in every state by the 1980s (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1983). State governments have delivered numerus public services through SPEs for a 
long time. 
There are various categories of conduit financing, and it is impossible to cover all 
of them thoroughly. In this study, I investigate a particular category of conduits: when an 
entity issues debt on behalf of one or multiple local governments. To be more specific, 
the primary subjects of this dissertation are Marks-Roos Bonds in California, U.S.A., and 
Chinese Urban Investment Bonds, which I will discuss in the following sections.  
Marks-Roos Bonds in California 
Marks-Roos Bonds (MRBs) are bonds issued by joint powers authorities (JPAs) 
under the Marks-Roos Local Bond Act of 1985(Article 4 of the Joint Exercise of Powers 
Authority law), the proceeds of which are passed to local governments to finance a wide 
variety of purposes. JPAs can loan the proceeds to local governments or buy whole 
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municipal bonds issued by local governments using the proceeds of MRBs. In this case, 
the joint powers agency serves as a conduit and is called the conduit issuer. The local 
agency borrowing money through a JPA is called the conduit borrower. 
Regarding debt limits, the Marks-Roos Act does not impose additional restrictions 
on conduit borrowers: “the form of the loan agreement between a JPA and local agency 
in each instance is tailored to the restrictions on indebtedness faced by the local agency 
obligor, rather than any restrictions imposed by the Marks-Roos Act itself. The Marks-
Roos Act imposes minimal procedural requirements on the issuance of bonds” (Fong, 
1998). The most common uses of the Marks-Roos Act include financing “public capital 
improvements,” creating pooled bond issues, and financing working capital or insurance 
programs. Only JPAs can issue MRBs (Lockyer, 2006; Fong, 1998).  
JPAs are special government entities created under the Joint Exercise of Powers 
Authority Law.  “Joint powers are exercised when the public officials of two or more 
agencies agree to create another legal entity or establish a joint approach to work on a 
common problem, fund a project, or act as a representative body for a specific activity” 
(California State Legislature, 2007). Joint powers can be exercised only through a joint 
powers agreement, or if the member agencies create a new, independent government 
organization. This government organization is known as a JPA, which is legally 
independent of the member agencies, but shares powers common to them. Joint powers 
are defined in the joint powers agreement. According to the California State Legislature, 
the “Agencies that can exercise joint powers include federal agencies, state departments, 
counties, cities, special districts, school districts, redevelopment agencies, and even other 
10 
 
joint powers organizations.” They also point out: “a California agency can even share 
joint powers with an agency in another state. JPAs are commonly used in areas such as 
groundwater management, road construction, habitat conservation, airport expansion, 
redevelopment projects, stadium construction, mental health facilities construction, 
educational programs, employee benefits services, insurance coverage, and regional 
transportation projects” (California State Legislature, 2007). In addition to the JPAs that 
handle these projects, there is also a kind of JPA created specifically for capital financing 
by issuing bonds. This is called a public financing authority.   
Chinese Urban Investment Bonds (UIBs) 
The State Council defines Local Government Funding Platforms (LGFPs) as legal 
entities founded by local governments and their subsidiaries by means of financial 
appropriation or asset injection (such as land, equity, etc.), specializing in funding, 
investing, constructing, and operating public or quasi-public projects commissioned by 
local governments (Wu, 2010).” LGFPs usually include many companies that are devoted 
to a specific purpose. These are called urban investment companies, such as the Shanghai 
Urban Construction Investment and Development Corporation. The bonds issued by 
these urban investment companies are called urban investment bonds (UIBs), which are 
considered quasi-municipal bonds. He and Man (2012) provide further explanations: 
“These quasi-public agencies generally are incorporated as different investment 
companies in order to finance and invest as a commercial entity. The state and local 
governments backed these financing platforms by imputing hard assets, such as land, 
state-owned properties, and even revenue from fees and taxes. In other words, the state 
and local governments bear certain liabilities to pay for the debt if the financing 
11 
 
platforms fail to meet their engagements. So these debts are considered to be the “hidden 
debt” of the SNGs although they are not included in the SNGs’ balance sheet.”3 
The State Council’s definition articulates that LGFPs have the following 
characteristics: 
First, it is the local governments and their subsidiaries that are actually in control 
of the urban investment companies within LGFPSs. Most of the projects they operate are 
nonprofit, though on the surface they often look like for-profit companies.  
Second, the local government’s investments usually include “financial 
appropriation or asset injection.” Financial appropriation involves the authorization of 
fiscal resources, and asset injections are the investment of nonfinancial assets such as 
land, stock rights or charge rights.  Each LGFP utilizes a mix of financial appropriation 
and asset injection activities.  
Third, the LGFPs’ services for “public or quasi-public projects,” like 
“constructing the infrastructures and properties, supporting facilities, communications 
and transportation, and so on” are “commissioned by the local governments.”   
Forth, LGFPs are independent legal entities. Most of them are limited liability 
companies, as are general trading companies such as construction investment companies, 
state-owned property operation companies, and industry investment companies such as 
water utility companies and transportation companies (Ministry of Finance, Development 
and Reform Commission, People's Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, 2010). It is important to emphasize that, despite being considered 
3 SNGs refer to local governments in this dissertation. 
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independent legal entities, LGFPs benefit from potential credit enhancements supported 
by local governments; in other words, these entities integrate government credits and 
commercial credits. In the early stages of an LGFP’s development, local governments 
usually inject assets to make the platforms bigger, and may also provide guarantee 
documents if necessary. Figure 2.1 shows the operation forms of LGFPs. 
The 4 trillion yuan economic stimulus plan includes 2.8 trillion yuan matching 
funds raised by local governments. Since there was a large gap between the local 
governments’ revenue and the matching funds, the central bank and China Banking 
Regulatory Commission provided some solutions, offering conditional support to local 
governments in establishing the funding platforms, issuing enterprise bonds, medium-
term notes, and using other financing instruments to broaden the financing channels (The 
People’s Bank of China, China banking regulatory commission, 2009). This kind of bond 
is called an urban investment bond and is viewed as quasi-municipal bond. As the 
municipal credit market expanded, many of the Chinese local governments took on large 
amounts debt. Along with this debt, new issues and concerns appeared, such as a high 
debt ratio and inadequate repayment abilities. In response, the central government began 
a series of reforms to prevent the potential municipal debt crisis. Since then, China’s local 
government funding platforms have become a high-priority social and economic issue. 
The regulatory supervision of quasi-municipal bonds in China is similar to enterprise 
bonds. They are subject to similar taxes and regulations as the enterprise bonds issued by 
for-profit corporations and are placed off-budget, which means that these debts are not 
reported in the same way as other municipal debts. This means that the Chinese 
budgeting and government accounting system does not officially provide any information 
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about the magnitude of these contingent debts. This arrangement ignores the objective 
needs presented by the development of municipal debt and that it will bring potential 
economic risks to both the central and local governments. 
LGFPs are creations of Chinese local governments and have different degrees of 
dependency on their parental governments. The relationships between LGFPs and their 
parental governments mainly depend on the leading departments of the urban investment 
companies’ executive, as well as the social status of the corporate executives involved. If 
their parental government agencies are important departments and are in charge of 
principal leaders of the municipal government or the Department of Finance, that LGFP 
would be very likely to receive strong government support. The social status of the 
corporate executives is also an important factor: if the corporate executives are also 
principal government leaders or former principal government leaders, then the possibility 
of access to government support is greater. Figure 2.1 below presents the operation form 
of LGFP, which shows the close connections between urban development and 
construction companies and parental governments. Figure 2.2 presents the operation 
structure of quasi-municipal bonds. 
  
14 
 
Figure 2.1 Operation Forms of China’s Local Government Funding Platforms 
 
As quasi-public agencies, the city investment companies incorporated in LGFPs 
do not have the right to levy taxes. In China, official central and local governments 
reserve this right. LGFPs exist only to solve capital shortage problems for the local 
governments and to provide public services.  
Figure 2.2 The Operation Structure of Quasi-municipal Bonds  
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This section summarizes five categories of conduit financing and focuses on a 
particular category of conduits in which an entity issues debt on behalf of one or multiple 
local governments: MRBs in California, U.S.A., and UIBs in China. In the following, 
detailed analysis of MRBs will be illustrated. MRBs will then be compared with UIBs to 
illustrate their characteristics further.  
Background of MRB 
This section reviews the motivation of utilizing MRBs and outlines the key 
characteristics of MRBs. MRBs are issued under the Marks-Roos Bond Act of 1985. 
Their issuance has been increasing gradually since 1986. MRBs are typically considered 
to be relatively risky. The issuance MRBs is reduced significantly during economic 
downturns, as the two figures below illustrate. Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 show the 
principal amount and numbers of issuance of MRBs. The blue bar indicates the actual 
number of MRBs, and the orange curve indicates their percentage compared to the whole 
long-term municipal bond market.   
16 
 
Figure 2.3 Principal Amount of Long-term MRBs in 1986-2015 
 
Data source: California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC) Figure 2.4 Number of Issuances of Long-term MRBs  
 
Data source: California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC) 
Motivation of Utilizing MRB 
The motivation to engage in MRBs has been presented in several ways. The 
enactment of the Marks-Roos Local Bond Act of 1985 was meant to facilitate bond 
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pooling, which would lower the costs of issuance (Lockyer, 2006). Bond pooling is 
especially useful when the par value of new issuance is small since a certain amount of 
fixed costs can be spread across different issues. Fixed issuance costs do not increase 
proportionally with the bond’s principal amount. Hence, MRBs are a greater burden for 
small issues than large issues. Small issues can benefit from economies of scale by 
entering a bond pooling through JPAs. 
Another motivation to engage in MRBs is enhanced marketability. On the one 
hand, JPAs have issued many bonds and built a relatively good reputation. Compared to 
small local agencies, investors are more familiar with JPAs. It has been documented that 
an issuers’ reputation influences borrowing costs. Typically, the use of MRBs is expected 
to result in lower borrowing costs than common municipal bonds issued by local agencies. 
On the other hand, in many cases, besides MRBs, local agencies can only issue 
certificates of participation (COP)4. It is believed that investors are more likely to accept 
Marks-Roos bonds than COPs. Therefore, conduit financing can potentially decrease 
local agencies’ borrowing costs because of marketability.  
The third motivation for local governments to use MRBs is the flexibility in 
issuance. MRBs issuance only requires a JPA passing a resolution. Voter approval is not 
required, which grants local governments more flexibility. However, the JPA has to 
4 A typical certificate of participation (COP) is “An instrument evidencing a pro rata share in a specific 
pledged revenue stream, usually lease payments by the issuer that are typically subject to annual 
appropriation. The certificate generally entitles the holder to receive a share, or participation, in the 
payments from a particular project. The payments are passed through the lessor to the certificate holders. 
The lessor typically assigns the lease and the payments to a trustee, which then distributes the payments to 
the certificate holders (Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, MSRB).” By investing a COP, investors 
(the certificate holders) are eligible to receive a share in the payments from a project associated with this 
COP.  The proceeds of the sale of the COPs are used to finance the project. 
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prove that the debt financing would generate significant public benefits before 
authorizing a new issuance. Some research on the role of public authorities in municipal 
capital markets states that public authorities are “borrowing machines” (Leigland, 1994; 
Davis, 1935), circumventing “many of rules that constrain general-purpose governments, 
such as voter approval and debt limits (Robbins & Simonsen, 2012).” It has also been 
suggested that conduit financing through public authorities “provides the legal framework 
for borrowing large sums of money (CDAC, 1993).” Revenue cuts due to changes in law 
and reduced federal aid promote this motivation. “In 1978, Californians enacted 
Proposition 13, which limited the ability of local public agencies to increase property 
taxes based on a property’s assessed value (California Tax Data).” Proposition 13, along 
with “sharp cuts in federal aid to state and local governments,” significantly “limited 
local government’s ability to fund public infrastructure.” As something of a response, the 
Marks-Roos Bond Pooling Act (Government Code §6584-6599.1) was created in 1985 
“to provide a flexible alternative method of financing needed improvements, along with 
the benefit of reduced borrowing costs through the use of bond pools.” 
To sum up, the motivation of utilizing MRBs is to obtain greater financing 
flexibility at lower borrowing costs compared to the interests paid in the absence of the 
Marks-Roos Act.  
Key Characteristics of MRB 
Players  
Federal agencies, state departments, counties, cities, special districts, school 
districts, redevelopment agencies, and even other joint powers organizations can establish 
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JPAs. JPAs may issue debt under the Mark-Roos Bond Pooling Act of 1985 to purchase 
municipal bonds from local agencies or make loans to them. Local agencies such as cities, 
counties, Mello-Roos community facilities districts, and special districts can be conduit 
borrowers or local obligors.   
Role of JPA 
JPAs play three important roles in conduit financing: producing information, 
providing potential enhancement, and promoting bond pooling. Before authorizing a new 
issuance, the JPA has to prove that debt financing would generate significant public 
benefits. The close relationships between JPAs and local agencies give the JPAs more 
opportunities to gain information about conduit borrowers’ qualities, even including 
some private information. Compared to a single local agency, especially a small one, 
JPAs usually have higher levels of management expertise, along with professional 
financial teams. This information could be used during the issuances of new MRBs. A 
number of conduit borrowers are small local agencies that may be unfamiliar to investors. 
In contrast, JPAs have usually built a strong reputation. These local agencies gain 
potential reputation enhancement from JPAs by using MRBs instead of directly issuing 
bonds themselves. Furthermore, JPAs are platforms for bond pooling, which can 
potentially reduce the borrowing costs due to issuance economies of scale.           
Responsibility of paying MRB  
In general, conduit financing is secured by the conduit borrower's credit, and the 
obligators are local agencies involved in the MRBs. JPAs are not responsible for the 
repayment of the debts. Rather, JPAs act “as a conduit issuer for the local agency and 
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[have] no obligation on the bonds other than to make payment from the payments 
received under the underlying agreement with the local agency (Fong, 1998).” In these 
situations, “the source of revenues for the underlying agreement with the local agency 
can vary greatly and will determine which type of agreement will likely be used.” 
Although JPAs, unlike insurance companies, do not have to pay the obligation in the 
event of default, they should avoid it regardless, as default would harm a JPA’s 
reputation.  
Comparison of the MRB and the UIB  
This section compares the MRB and the UIB from five perspectives. The key 
difference is that MRB is a municipal bond, and UIB is essentially a corporate bond. 
Issuing Purpose  
MRBs are used for a variety of purposes. Figure 2.5 below presents a summary of 
principal amount with respect to MRB issuance for the 1985-2016 period. The largest 
category in terms of principal amounts is “multiple capital improvements,” which 
includes a variety of categories5. The term “multiple capital improvements” does not 
specify the actual purpose of issuing; for example, this category may include exhibition 
buildings, police stations, and fire stations. 
   
  
5 For a list and example of “multiple capital improvements” please see California Debt and Investment 
Advisory Commission (CDIAC), California debt issuance primer, 2006, page 146. 
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Figure 2.5 Principle Amount by Purposes of MRBs 
 
Data source: The California State Treasure 
UIBs usually finance “public or quasi-public projects commissioned by local 
governments,” such as constructing infrastructure and properties, supporting facilities, 
communications, and transportation, and so on. Urban investment bonds mainly focus on 
urban infrastructure construction. 
Tax-exempt Status 
For tax purposes, municipal bonds in the U.S. can be classified into two 
categories: tax-exempt or taxable. “Qualifying municipal bonds are tax-exempt, which 
means that the interest earned on these bonds is exempt from federal (and usually state) 
income tax (Dwight, 2012).” Most MRBs are tax-exempt. MRBs do not have unique 
federal tax issues, but, like other common municipal bonds, are subject to federal tax 
limitations and the requirements of local governments, such as limitations relating to 
private activity bonds, arbitrage bonds, and hedge bonds (Lockyer, 2006). 
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In China, there is no specific tax-exemption policy for either issuers or investors 
of UIBs. Urban investment companies need to pay corporate taxes, just like other general, 
for-profit companies; the bondholders also have to pay income tax. While at this stage, 
the government gives these urban investment enterprises various tax preferential policies 
as a form of subsidy. 
Types of Securities 
Marks-Roos Act does not specify a revenue source that must be pledged as 
security for MRBs, and MRBs may potentially be secured by any local agency’s revenue 
sources, regardless of whether it is tax, fee, or another revenue source. Thus, MRBs 
involve a variety of debt types. Figure 2.6 below presents four categories of debt type 
based on a summary of the principal amount of MRB issuance for the 1985-2016 period. 
The largest category in terms of principal amounts is “special assessment bond”; the 
source of repayment for this category is the special assessment payments that secure 
assessment bonds. The JPA purchases assessment bonds using the proceeds of its MRBs, 
and the debt service’s payments on assessment bonds flow through the JPA to the 
bondholders of MRBs. Again, “the use of special assessment is restricted by law to public 
improvements that provide a direct benefit to the assessed property” (Fong, 1998). 
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Figure 2.6 Principle Amount by Bond Type of MRBs 
 
Data source: The California State Treasure 
In China, local governments have issued many UIBs as “quasi-municipal bonds” 
through LGFPs. These bonds usually tie into certain projects such as utility services or 
public transportation. Some bonds are for paid by the revenue of these projects, but in 
most cases, local governments allocate funds annually to establish a certain amount of 
special sinking funds in order to purchase special services or to dedicate certain special 
revenues (such as a specific area of land premium) for the repayment of debt funding. 
This means these bonds are partially supported by local governments’ tax revenues. 
Because platform companies lack operating assets, either asset disposal will occur or 
third party guarantors will have to deal with the compensatory situation in the event that 
the issuers of such bonds are unable to pay the principal and interest of the source of 
funds. Quasi-municipal bonds could be considered as a mix of revenue bonds and GO 
bonds/public funds. In general, such bonds do not fit easily into either category. 
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Method of Sale 
Three methods of sale are used for MSBs: competitive sale, negotiated sale, and 
private placement. In the U.S.A., large issuers with a strong credit rating (and strong 
market) usually tend to use competitive bids. Issuers use negotiated bonds sales to get 
more flexibility for timing and marketing the issuance.   
In China, competitively bids are widely used; however, negotiated bond sales 
exist as well, usually called “Private Placement Notes.” PPNs are usually issued to 
specific institutional investors in the inter-bank bond market by way of the non-public 
issuance of debt. On April 29, 2011, China’s National Association of Financial Market 
Institutional Investors (NAFMII) released "inter-bank bond market, non-financial 
corporate debt financing instruments [and] non-public private placement rules." On May 
4, 2011, the inter-bank bond market launched the first non-public debt financing 
instruments.  
Conclusion and Policy Implication 
This chapter reviews the background context and provides analysis of the 
motivation for using conduits, as well as their key characteristics. MRBs and UIBs are 
compared to identify the similarities and differences of the two mechanism’s perspectives. 
This chapter is intended to provide an objective picture of how conduit financing has 
been used, and to facilitate discussions about the costs and benefits of using conduit 
financing. Conduit financing provides an alternative method for the local agencies to 
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finance public projects, offers more flexibility, and potentially reduces local agencies’ 
borrowing costs.  
Are stricter regulations needed to curb abusive transactions in conduit financing? 
There is no easy answer. As a matter of fact, regulations related to MRBs and UIBs have 
been amended. In California, the Marks-Roos Act has changed to “curb the imposition of 
excessive fees, to severely restrict blind pools, and to outlaw Roving JPAs” (Fong, 1998). 
Fong believes that the current problem stems from “a deficiency in [the] enforcement of 
the law, rather than a flawed statute” (Fong, 1998). The California debt and investment 
advisory commission “believes that the flexibility afforded by the Marks-Roos Act has 
allowed local agencies to save time, money and effort in their issuance of bonds. 
Moreover, there appears to be little to be gained by undertaking a major reform effort, as 
what problems do exist are better addressed by law enforcement” (Fong, 1998). 
According to Fong, the appropriate use of the Marks-Roos Act “provides a valuable tool 
for local officials in carrying out their debt management duties.” On the other hand, along 
with concerns regarding Chinese municipal debt after the 2008 financial crisis, the central 
government is very determined to tighten the issuance and management of UIBs. To 
control the risk of municipal debt, China’s State Council issued ‘notice on strengthening 
management issues of local government financing platform’ in June of 2010, calling for 
the constraints of local governments’ municipal debts. Additionally, the China Treasury 
and other related committees put forward some implement measures in July. 6 
Furthermore, the central government is actively moving to legalize the issuance of local 
6Shanghai Institute research group of state-owned capital operation. Shanghai local government investment 
and financing platform for investment and financing mechanism’s innovation research [J]. Shanghai 
Administration Institute, May 2012 Volume 13, No. 3, P59-70. 
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governments’ municipal bonds to replace the “quasi-municipal bonds” role of UIB. In 
fact, the central government amended the budget law about limitations on local 
government bond issuance. Under the new budget law, the country's 31 provincial-level 
administrative units and five municipalities can issue municipal bonds and do not have to 
rely on debt financing through LGFP as of 2015, which many regard as a significant 
change of budget law.  
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Chapter 3 Does Conduit Financing Reduce Borrowing Costs of Local Governments? 
Introduction 
Municipal bonds have played an important role in fiscal management and 
economic development. Municipal bond financing makes more resources available for 
state and local governments to invest in infrastructure and capital projects. It can also 
make living environments more convenient and potentially stimulate economies. 
However, there are also drawbacks to municipal bond financing, as the debt it creates can 
be a problem if it gets out of control. Concern about this kind of risk has been present 
since the origin of municipal bonds. State and local governments might be subject to 
balanced budget requirements, competition between comparable jurisdictions, and the 
influence of federal policies. As a result, public finance researchers have considerable 
interest in how to use municipal bonds wisely and constrain the level of debt within the 
affordability scope. 
A conduit, which allows one entity to issue debt on behalf of one or multiple 
governments, provides an alternative way for local governments to access credit markets 
and can potentially reduce borrowing costs. But conduit operation brings extra financial 
and administrative burdens. Since most local governments carry heavy debts, it is 
important to study whether or not conduit financing actually decreases their borrowing 
costs. To my knowledge, there are very limited studies on conduit financing. This 
dissertation seeks to bridge this gap. 
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Two main questions need to be addressed: (1) what drives local agencies to use 
conduits, and (2) did conduits save money for local agencies or cost more? Although 
conduit financing is supposed to lower borrowing costs through bond pooling, most of 
the bonds issued by JPAs are financed by a single local agency. It is important to 
investigate the incentives of these local agencies to use conduits instead of arm’s length 
investors, and whether or not conduit financing reduces borrowing costs. 
Background 
Marks-Roos Local Bonds (MRBs) are authorized by the Marks-Roos Local Bond 
Act of 1985 (Article 4 of the Joint Exercise of Powers Authority law), which provides 
joint powers authorities (JPA) with the general ability to issue bonds for a variety of 
purposes. This legislation was enacted primarily to provide local agencies with the 
opportunity to achieve issuance cost economies through bond pooling. However, its 
actual usage has been broader, as its flexibility allows it to be used for single project 
financing (Lockyer, 2006; Fong, 1998). 
The most common uses of the Marks-Roos Act include financing “public capital 
improvements,” creating pooled bond issues, and financing working capital or insurance 
programs. Only JPAs may issue MRBs. JPAs are special government entities created 
under the Joint Exercise of Powers Authority Law through an agreement between two or 
more public agencies, who are considered JPA members.  
CDIAC gives several reasons for why local agencies use JPAs, including the 
flexibility of issuance, the marketing advantage provided by substituting bonds for COPs, 
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and the ability to disperse fixed issuance costs through bond pools. The issuance of 
MRBs requires only that a JPA pass a resolution. No voter approval is needed, which 
grants local governments more flexibility. For example, redevelopment agencies 
frequently issue MRB rather than traditional revenue bonds since they have to meet “a 
competitive bid requirement on new issues and advance refundings of tax allocation 
bonds under the Health & Safety Code (Fong, 1998).” Although the creation of a conduit 
is intended to reduce local borrowing costs and to promote the utilization of bond pooling, 
Robbins and Simonsen (2012) found that conduit bonds, based on data of Marks-Roos 
Bonds in California from 2007 to 2009, pay higher interest costs and issuance costs.  
Theoretical Framework  
Municipal bonds differ on their interest rates or yields from one to another; one of 
the most important reasons are varying degrees of default risks that they carry. “A default 
is a situation when a debt obligation is not met, that is, the principal or interest payments 
are not paid when they are due (Levine, Scorsone & Justice, 2012).” Accordingly, default 
risk is the “issuer’s ability and willingness to make principal and interest payments on 
time and in full (Johnson & Kriz, 2002).” All of municipal bonds are subject to default 
risks, and therefore, issuers are required by investors to pay default risk premiums, which 
are positively associated with their default risks. Specifically, a default risk premium is 
defined as (Rose &Marquis, 2007): 
Default risk premium =Promised yield on a risky asset – Risk-free interest rate 
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where the promised yield on Promised yield on a risky asset is the yield to maturity of a 
risky security; and the risk-free interest rate is the interest rate of a risk-free security, such 
as treasury securities. A greater default risk is associated with a higher default risk 
premium. 
Interest rates of municipal bonds are clearly associated with risks. All investors of 
municipal bonds face credit risk and market risk. The credit risk is the chance that the 
obligor on municipal bonds will be unable to make the debt service payments; credit risk 
is unique to a particular bond and is reflected in its bond rating (O'Hara，2011). Market 
risk refers the potential price fluctuation of a bond due to changes in the market interest 
rates, including inflation risk and liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is “the risk that an investor 
may not be able to buy or sell a bond because there is no market for that bond at a 
particular time (O'Hara，2011).” When investors believe that they carry more risks for 
holding a particular municipal bond than other securities, they ask for a higher yield or 
interest rate.        
However, only the issuers know the true information about their default risk. They 
have incentives to hold the bad information and only publish good information. Because 
of the information asymmetry problem, investors of municipal bonds will always require 
high yields if they cannot distinguish bonds between high and low default risks. High 
quality debtors would go for other financing methods if they can reduce the costs. Finally, 
only low quality debtors stay at the municipal bonds market, which cause the “lemon 
problem.” Scholars and practitioners have been working to promote market transparency 
and flow of information, to avoid this from happening.   
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Information asymmetry is of greater concern for conduit bonds. While a local 
agency is allowed to issue municipal bonds in compliance with the constitution and laws 
within the debt limit, it also can borrow through a JPA. In this case, the joint powers 
agency serves as a conduit, and is called the conduit issuer. The local agency that is 
borrowing money through a JPA is called the conduit borrower7. During the borrowing 
process, a JPA, especially a public financing authority (formed solely for the purpose of 
executing Marks-Roos bonds), serves as a type of financial intermediary. The emergence 
and existence of this type of conduit are profoundly historical and political.  One reason 
for this is the asymmetry of information within the municipal bond market. The 
disclosure requirements enforced by the municipal bond market are less strict than those 
imposed by the corporate bond market, and many small issuers are less known by 
municipal bond investors.  
During the borrowing process, the JPA is a type of financial intermediary that can 
reorganize small issuances more efficiently. Hence, sophisticated local agencies prefer to 
borrow directly from the credit market under their name. They do not choose their debt 
financing method randomly, which implies a selection bias. To deal with this problem, I 
implement two-stage selection model. In the two sections that follow, I will analyze two 
questions. The first section identifies what kinds of local agencies utilize the direct bond 
issuing method. That is: what drives local agencies to use conduits? The second section 
7The MRSB website provides definitions and more information of related concepts: “the issuance of 
municipal securities by a governmental unit (referred to as the “issuer” or “conduit issuer”) to finance a 
project to be used primarily by a third party, which may be a for-profit entity engaged in private enterprise, 
a 501(c)(3) organization, or another governmental entity (referred to as the “conduit borrower”). In a 
conduit financing, the conduit borrower is liable for making debt service payments on the bonds. Industrial 
development bonds, multi-family housing revenue bonds and qualified 501(c)(3) bonds are common types 
of conduit financings. See: 501(c)(3); HOUSING REVENUE BOND – Multi-family housing revenue 
bonds; INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOND; PRIVATE ACTIVITY BOND.” 
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examines whether or not conduit bonds bear greater or lesser costs than non-conduit 
bonds.  
Debt Financing Choices  
Solutions to the rampant asymmetry of information within the municipal bond 
market are in high demand. Credit rating agencies exist for this reason; they work as 
certification agencies, which screen and sort debt issuers (Wakeman, 1981; Johnson, 
1999; Johnson & Kriz, 2002). On one hand, credit rating agencies use their resources to 
collect both available and non-published information on financial, economic, 
administrative and other relevant attributes of debt issuers; on the other hand, 
professionals in credit rating agencies process this information based on their financial 
knowledge and provide sophisticated predictions of the issuers’ default risks. Similarly, 
JPAs also screen MRBs issuers for “loose” certification. A potential advantage of JPAs is 
that they are more likely to obtain private information by communicating regularly with 
conduit borrowers. 
Finance literature considers banks – a type of financial intermediary – to be good 
reorganizers (Bolton and Sharfstein 1996; Gilson, Kose, and Lang 1990; Cantillo and 
Wright 2000). The research of Cantillo and Wright (2000) is perhaps the most relevant. 
They argue that financial intermediary theories “assume that intermediaries extract 
information more efficiently than arm’s length investors, which implies that companies 
with severe informational asymmetries borrow through banks.” Their empirical results 
suggest that “intermediaries are indeed at an informational advantage over arm’s length 
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investors, and that this advantage is best captured by a theory that sees banks as 
reorganizers rather than as project screeners.”  
The Marks-Roos Local Bond Pooling Act allows local agencies to borrow 
through a JPA. The problem of information asymmetry is more severe in municipal bond 
markets than in corporate bond markets, and financial intermediaries play a more 
important role in extracting, reorganizing, and delivering information. Unlike banks, 
JPAs absorb capital and make investments simultaneously.     
Borrowing the theory of intermediaries’ reorganization from finance literature, 
my model assumes that JPAs extract and reorganize information about local agencies 
more efficiently than municipal bond investors and that these transaction costs can 
decrease even further as a result of repeated coordination between JPAs and conduit 
borrowers. This implies that borrowers with severe information asymmetry go to JPAs 
and borrowers with less information asymmetry and avoid the extra intermediaries since 
the extra fee they charge outweighs any potential benefit. Based on this line of reasoning, 
I propose the following hypotheses: 
First of all, it is generally known that high-quality borrowers are very unlikely to 
default, and so they require less verification. Consequently, they can avoid JPAs to 
reduce borrowing costs. Low-quality borrowers, however, are at a higher risk of 
defaulting. They benefit from JPAs’ reorganization and verification, which entails lower 
borrowing costs than directly tapping into municipal bondholders. Figure 3.1 shows that 
although both issue methods charge more to low-quality borrowers, municipal 
bondholders increase their rates faster than JPAs.  
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Figure 3.1 Borrower Qualities and Interest Costs 
 
Hypothesis 1: high-quality local agencies that are in great fiscal condition will 
tap directly into the credit market. Low-quality local agencies, however, will use conduits. 
Second, many small issuers are less known by municipal bond investors. Because 
of information asymmetry, JPAs may have marketing advantages over small local 
agencies that are less sophisticated and not as well known by investors. Since the 
transparency within the municipal bond market is still relatively low, and information 
cannot flow freely, sophisticated issuers benefit from the experience and professionalism 
of JPAs, which results in lower borrowing costs. 
Hypothesis 2: sophisticated issuers prefer arm’s length investors. 
Third, CDIAC states that local agencies use JPAs in order to disperse fixed 
issuance costs through bond pools. Fixed issuance costs do not increase proportionally 
with a bond’s principal amount. Hence, they are a greater burden for small issues than 
large issues. Small issues can benefit from economies of scale by engaging in bond 
pooling through JPAs. For large issues, however, this benefit is outweighed by the 
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diminished flexibility that borrowers have to coordinate with other borrowers within the 
same pool and may not obtain the best results in terms of timing and structures.   
Hypothesis 3: Bond issues of a small principal amount prefer conduit financing.  
Hypothesis 4: Bond issues for some purposes are more likely to utilize conduit 
financing. 
Interest Costs 
As mentioned above, most conduit bonds are issued for a single borrower, 
although the legislation of JPA debt financing aims to lower costs through bond pooling. 
As a matter of fact, conduit bonds may or may not obtain lower interest costs or issuance 
costs. There are many reasons for this: 
a). Risk dispersion  
Normal municipal bonds issued by local agencies disperse the risk of default to a 
number of different investors. Each investor holds only a small portion of the bond and 
bears a small portion of default risk. However, if local agencies access credit market 
through a conduit (etc., a JPA in California) either through a loan or purchased bonds, the 
JPA bears all of the default risks. To be clear, a JPA is not required to pay off conduit 
debts if a local agency decides to default. But the default harms the reputation of the JPA, 
as the JPA is the conduit issuer. This will increase the borrowing cost of other bonds in 
the future. As an intermediary, JPA may ask for a higher risk premium. Therefore, the 
borrowing costs would be higher than normal municipal bonds. 
b). Marketability 
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JPAs have issued many bonds and built a relatively good reputation. Compared to 
small local agencies, investors are more familiar with JPAs. It has been documented that 
the reputation of issuers influences borrowing costs. Additionally, local agencies can 
often only issue COPs, while local agencies can get the bond proceeds of Marks-Roos 
bonds through a JPA. It is believed that investors accept Marks-Roos bonds more readily 
than COPs. Therefore, conduit financing potentially decreases local agencies’ borrowing 
costs because of marketability. 
c). Complexity 
Generally, the municipal bond market is considered highly illiquid. Compared to 
other revenue bonds, conduit bonds are even more complex. One MRB may involve one 
or several local agencies as conduit borrowers with different projects. Though the special 
features of municipal bonds give borrowers more flexibility and attract certain investors 
with similar demands, securities with simpler features and standard characteristics, such 
as treasury bills, are typically more likely to find sellers and buyers and therefore, are 
more liquid. If a security is not liquid and a seller finds it difficult to have bond buyer 
demands, the seller has to sell the security at a discount or hold onto it. “Improved 
liquidity is expected to increase securities values because rational investors discount 
securities more heavily in the presence of higher trading costs, holding other things 
equal”(Amihud, Mendelson, & Pedersen, 2012). Investors have the illiquidity expectation 
of municipal bonds and are not willing to accept low yields even though the actual 
default rate is very low. Conduit debt financing is usually more complex and involves 
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more information asymmetry. Investors may require higher yields than other municipal 
bonds. 
For these reasons, it is not obvious whether or not JPAs help local agencies to 
reduce their borrowing costs. In the following section, I will use empirical analysis to 
explore this question further.   
Empirical Model 
Data 
The data used in this chapter comes from the California Debt and Investment 
Advisory Commission (CDIAC), which covers all levels of debt issuers during the years 
of 1984 to 2016, and was supplemented by the Revenue Bond Index produced by the 
Bond Buyer. The fiscal information of local governments comes from the United States 
Census Bureau, and is organized by Kawika Pierson, Mike Hand, and Fred Thompson 
(Pierson, Hand, & Thompson, 2015).  
Methodology 
Debt financing Choices  
Municipalities vary in terms of scale. They have distinct levels of population, 
revenue, and expenditure. They also differ in their financial management capacity. 
Literature on fiscal decentralization has revealed a concern about the capacity of local 
level governments. Because of relatively lower salaries and fewer opportunities for career 
advancement, it is harder for local governments to attract elites’ participation than it is for 
higher-level governments. Although the democratic process implies that elected officials 
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should follow the will of their jurisdiction, Prud'homme (1995) argues that this does not 
always happen at the local level (Prud'homme 1995). Financial management capacity can 
vary across states and different levels of government.  
The quality of an issuer is a combination of its financial situation and financial 
management capacity. Ideally, the quality of debtors should be measured by the fiscal 
indexes of the local agencies. Unfortunately, this data is limited, and I would lose most 
observations if I were to use the revenues of jurisdictions. In this study, two factors – “not 
rated” and “issuer group” – are used as proxies of borrowers’ qualities.  Dummy 
variables indicating “not rated” bonds and “issuer group” are incorporated into the model 
to test their impact on debt financing choices. 
In order to test the second hypothesis, I use two proxies for issuer sophistication. 
First, following Roden and Bland (1986), issuer sophistication is measured by the number 
of issues sold in the prior 10 years. Only the direct issues are considered, and bond issues 
through JPAs are viewed as irrelevant. Second, if a local agency has a top 10 financial 
advisor to provide professional opinions, then the local agency is considered a 
sophisticated borrower.  
To test the third and fourth hypotheses, bond issuance purpose and principal 
amount are used to examine the impact of bond features on decision making. 30 year 
Treasury bond rates are used as a riskless capital rate.     
Interest Costs 
Literature on municipal bonds’ concerns about interest costs is rich and extensive 
(Liu and Denison, 2014; Simonsen, Robbins and Helgerson, 2001; Peng and Brucato, 
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2003; Daniels and Vijayakumar, 2007). Most early studies focus on the role of the issue 
feature of the bond and the characteristics of bond issuers in determining the interest 
costs. Numerous studies indicate the effects of different bond characteristics, such as the 
features of specific tax-exempt bonds, the characteristics of the issuers, the scope of the 
market for the bonds, and the conditions under which the bonds are initially sold all vary 
greatly across individual bond issues, on a bond’s yield (Cook 1982). In terms of sale 
types, both competitive bidding and negotiated sale have their advantages and 
disadvantages. In general, competitive bidding is expected to produce lower costs, and 
negotiated sale is especially useful for those issuers that have not built their reputations. 
Using data on municipal bond sales in Oregon from 1994 to 1997, Simonsen, Bill, Mark 
D. Robbins, and Lee Helgerson found that competitive sales result in significantly lower 
interest rates compared to negotiated sales. 
The bond true interest rates (TIC) and issuance costs are modeled as a function of 
Marks-Roos bond propensity score, market interest rate, and control variables. My 
empirical model is as follows:  
TIC or issuance cost = f (Market interest rate, Marks-Roos bond propensity score, w), 
where 
Market interest rate = market interest rate produced by the Bond Buyer (the Revenue 
Bond Index) 
Marks-Roos bond propensity score = A latent scale of the degree to which a county or 
school district, etc., is likely to use a conduit bond. 
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w is a vector of control variables. Following previous studies (Robbins and 
Simonsen, 2012; Ely, 2013; Liu and Denison, 2014), control variables include 
Competitive = Dummy variable; 1 if the bond is sold via competitive bid; 0 if not  
Ln (principal)8 = Natural logarithm of the principal amount of the bond/note  
Ln (years to maturity) = Natural logarithm of the bond length 
Refunding = Dummy variable; 1 if the bond is sold to refund another bond; 0 if not 
Credit Ratings = Highest credit ratings provided by Moody’s, S&P or Fitch.  
Enhancement = Dummy variable; 1 if the bond has any kind of credit enhancement; 0 if 
not 
Sale Year = Year that the bond was first issued  
Bond Type = A series of dummy variables representing bond types by payment sources 
Callable = Dummy variable; 1 if the bond is callable; 0 if not 
Estimation 
In order to examine what drives the decision between debt financing methods and 
whether conduit financing reduces interest rates, this study uses a data set that covers 
long-term bonds issued by all levels of local governments during the years of 1984 to 
2016, including Cities, Counties, K-14 Schools, Mello-Roos, Special Districts, JPAs, and 
8 Along with previous public finance literature, this study also use natural logarithm of the principal amount 
and natural logarithm of the bond length. This transformation has good features: it does not change the 
fluctuation direction of a variable, but the coefficients are easier to interpret. 
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UC & CSU. This sample not only has the information of bond features but also contains 
data on issuer characteristics, including the number of issues sold in the prior 10 years by 
a government agency. If the agency has a top financial adviser, the Bond Buyer Revenue 
Bond Index is used as a market benchmark of the interest rates; Treasury bill yield is used 
to control the inflation factor; both of them are matched in the same week with the issue 
date of the particular bond.  
Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1 below shows the summary statistics of continuous variables.  Summary 
statistics of the full sample, conduit bonds, and non-conduit bonds are reported separately. 
Means of TIC, Bond Buyer Revenue Bond Index, and years to maturity are similar in the 
three samples. Marks-Roos bonds have smaller average principal amounts than other 
bonds in the sample. The prior issuance number of Marks-Roos bonds has a larger mean, 
but also a larger standard deviation than other bonds. 
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
Full sample 
     
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
TIC 6,554 5.467 1.573 0.126 14.000 
Bond Buyer Revenue Bond 
Index 6,560 5.608 1.013 4.290 10.250 
Treasury bill yield 6,560 5.492 1.574 2.490 11.920 
Principal amount (million) 6,560 30.700 74.700 0.006 1,970.000 
Year to maturity 5,574 22.338 8.526 1.000 44.000 
Prior issuance number 6,560 16.926 30.613 0.000 367.000 
Natural log of principal 
amount 6,560 16.058 1.653 8.693 21.399 
Natural log of year to maturity 5,574 2.999 0.530 0.000 3.784 
      Non-MRB 
     
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
TIC 6,177 5.470 1.583 0.126 14.000 
Bond Buyer Revenue Bond 
Index 6,178 5.637 1.032 4.290 10.250 
Treasury bill yield 6,178 5.531 1.607 2.490 11.920 
Principal amount (million) 6,178 31.900 76.600 0.006 1,970.000 
Year to maturity 5,192 22.338 8.566 1.000 44.000 
Prior issuance number 6,178 16.290 30.382 0.000 367.000 
Natural log of principal 
amount 6,178 16.099 1.663 8.693 21.399 
Natural log of year to maturity 5,192 2.998 0.533 0.000 3.784 
      MRB 
     
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
TIC 377 5.418 1.410 0.905 12.000 
Bond Buyer Revenue Bond 
Index 382 5.140 0.403 4.380 6.520 
Treasury bill yield 382 4.867 0.616 2.980 7.570 
Principal amount (million) 382 10.600 17.100 0.110 182.000 
Year to maturity 382 22.348 7.974 2.000 40.000 
Prior issuance number 382 27.204 32.488 0.000 119.000 
Natural log of principal 
amount 382 15.388 1.305 11.608 19.017 
Natural log of year to maturity 382 3.014 0.486 0.693 3.689 
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Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 show bond issue purposes. In this sample, most Marks-
Roos bonds are issued for “multiple capital improvements” and “Redevelopment,” which 
account for approximately 67.28%. Other bonds are concentrated in K-12 school 
facilities and other purposes. 
Table 3.2 Bond Issue Purposes 
Non-MRB      
 
K-12 
School 
Facility 
Multiple Capital 
Improvements, 
Public Works 
Redevelopment, 
Multiple Purposes Other Total 
F     2,269 617 523 2,769 6,178 
RP  36.73 9.99 8.47 44.82 100 
MRB      
F     72 150 107 53 382 
RP  18.85 39.27 28.01 13.87 100 
Total      
F     2,341 767 630 2,822 6,560 
RP  35.69 11.69 9.60 43.02 100 
Note: F refers to frequency; RP refers to row percentage  Figure 3.2 Bond Issue Purposes (Percentage) 
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Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3 present bond credit ratings. In this sample, 96.07% of 
Marks-Roos bonds are not rated. Other bonds of “not rated” only account for 24%, and 
49.95% of them have the highest ratings (AAA).   
Table 3.3 Bond Credit Ratings 
Non-MRB        
 
AAA AA A BBB BB Not rated Total 
F     3,086 918 497 190 4 1,483 6,178 
RP  49.95 14.86 8.04 3.08 0.06 24.00 100 
MRB 
       F     13 0 1 1 0 367 382 
RP  3.40 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.00 96.07 100 
Total 
       F     3,099 918 498 191 4 1,850 6,560 
RP  47.24 13.99 7.59 2.91 0.06 28.20 100 
Note: F refers to frequency; RP refers to row percentage  Figure 3.3 Bond Credit Ratings (Percentage) 
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Table 3.4 and Figure 3.4 shows bond issues divided by bond features and conduit 
financing, where "General obligation bond" accounts for 36.26% in the non_MRB 
sample, while 37.7% of Marks-Roos bonds in this sample are "Limited tax obligation 
bond." 
Table 3.4 Debt Types 
Non-MRB        
 
General 
obligation 
bond 
Limited 
tax 
obligation 
bond 
Marks-
Roos 
Authority 
Loan 
Special 
assessment 
bond 
Tax 
allocation 
bond Other Total 
F     2,240 415 12 300 553 2,658 6,178 
RP  36.26 6.72 0.19 4.86 8.95 43.02 100 
MRB 
       F     64 144 83 36 35 20 382 
RP  16.75 37.70 21.73 9.42 9.16 5.24 100 
Total 
       F     2,304 559 95 336 588 2,678 6,560 
RP  35.12 8.52 1.45 5.12 8.96 40.82 100 
Note: F refers to frequency; RP refers to row percentage  Figure 3.4 Debt Types (Percentage) 
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Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 show other bond features and issuers characteristics. The 
majority (52.69%) of non-MRB bought enhancement, while only 7.33% of Marks Roo 
bond. In terms of the issuer groups, it involves a number of local governments, city 
government’s account for 22.59% of bond issue.  
Table 3.5 Other Bonds Statistics (Frequency and Percentage) 
  
Non-
MRB 
 
MRB 
 
Total 
 
  
F RP  F  RP  F RP  
 Top 
financial 
advisor 
NO 4,354 76.94 235 62.17 4,589 76.01 
YES 1,305 23.06 143 37.83 1,448 23.99 
Tota
l 5,659 100 378 100 6,037 100 
 Competitive 
sale 
NO 4,866 78.76 360 94.24 5,226 79.66 
YES 1,312 21.24 22 5.76 1,334 20.34 
Tota
l 6,178 100 382 100 6,560 100 
 
Enhancement 
NO 2,923 47.31 354 92.67 3,277 49.95 
YES 3,255 52.69 28 7.33 3,283 50.05 
Tota
l 6,178 100 382 100 6,560 100 
 Callable 
NO 3,135 50.74 122 31.94 3,257 49.65 
YES 3,043 49.26 260 68.06 3,303 50.35 
Tota
l 6,178 100 382 100 6,560 100 
Refunding 
NO 4,098 66.46 212 55.64 4,310 65.83 
YES 2,068 33.54 169 44.36 2,237 34.17 
Tota
l 6,166 100 381 100 6,547 100 
Note: F refers to frequency; RP refers to row percentage  
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Table 3.6 Summary of Issuer Groups 
group(IssuerGroup) Freq. Percent Cum. 
Cities 8,754 22.59 22.59 
Counties 2,622 6.77 29.36 
JPA & Marks-Roos 8,758 22.60 51.96 
K-14 Schools 6,844 17.66 69.63 
Mello-Roos 2,731 7.05 76.68 
Special Districts 4,258 10.99 87.67 
State of California 4,541 11.72 99.39 
UC & CSU 238 0.61 100 
Total 38,746 100 
  
Regression Results 
Table 3.7 shows the results of the Probit regression9 of the debt financing method 
decision model. The models are significant, and most of the factors are significant, and 
most of the coefficients are as expected. The results suggest that all else being held equal, 
“not rated” bonds and small principal amount issues are more likely to use conduit 
financing. The negative coefficient of the prior issuance number proves the hypothesis 
that sophisticated issuers are less likely to use conduits. Counter to expectation, the 
coefficient of top financial advisors is positive, which suggests that more sophisticated 
issuers also prefer conduit financing. This could be explained by two reasons. First, 
issuers with top financial advisors are more familiar with the municipal bonds market and 
believe that conduit financing brings greater benefits for those conduit financing cases. 
Second, the top financial advisors do not perfectly capture issuer sophistication.  
  
9 Probit model is more preferred here than linear probability model because the aim to use this model is to 
predict issuers’ financing decisions rather than coefficients of dependent variables.   
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Table 3.7 Probit Regression of Debt Financing Method Decision Model 
 
Probit regression 
    
Number of obs = 22931 
     
LR chi2(13) = 4273.57 
     
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Log likelihood = -3490.9585 
   
Pseudo R2 = 0.3797 
       
       
MRB Coefficient 
Standard 
Error z P>z 
[95% Confident 
Interval] 
       Not rated 1.389 0.051 27.26 <0.001 1.289 1.489 
K-12 School Facility 0.907 0.072 12.67 <0.001 0.767 1.047 
Multiple Capital 
Improvements, 
Public Works 0.946 0.055 17.11 <0.001 0.838 1.055 
Redevelopment, 
Multiple Purposes 1.445 0.062 23.36 <0.001 1.324 1.566 
Treasury bill yield -0.236 0.012 -20.12 <0.001 -0.259 -0.213 
Natural log of 
principal amount -0.032 0.012 -2.57 0.010 -0.056 -0.008 
Top financial advisor 0.228 0.041 5.61 <0.001 0.148 0.308 
Prior issuance 
number -0.001 0.000 -2.16 0.030 -0.002 0.000 
Issuer Group 
      Counties 0.010 0.066 0.16 0.875 -0.120 0.141 
K-14 Schools -0.698 0.088 -7.96 <0.001 -0.870 -0.526 
Mello-Roos 0.334 0.054 6.20 <0.001 0.229 0.440 
Special Districts -0.227 0.073 -3.10 0.002 -0.371 -0.083 
UC & CSU -0.177 0.546 -0.32 0.746 -1.248 0.894 
       Constant -1.462 0.214 -6.82 <0.001 -1.883 -1.042 
*Note: issuer group "Cities" are omitted as the reference group.  
 
Table 3.8 shows the results of instrumental variables (2SLS) regression of interest 
costs model. The IV strategy here is to predict a propensity score from a Probit, which is 
then used as the IV for using a conduit bond. This is similar to using propensity scores in 
other policy studies.  The propensity score is the fitted value from the Probit, which is a 
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latent scale of the degree to which a county or school district, etc., is likely to use a 
conduit bond10.  In the dummy variable group of "rating," bonds with rating lower than 
BBB are omitted as the reference group; in the dummy variable group of "Debt Type," 
other debt types except the four groups that are listed here are omitted as the reference 
group, and Cities in the “Issuer Group” are omitted as the reference group to avoid the 
“dummy trap.”  
Most of the control variables are the same as expected. The coefficients of the 
dummy variable “Marks-Roos bond indicator” are negative and significant. This suggests 
that controlling for other factors, TICs of conduit bonds are less than other bonds in the 
sample by an average of 3.665 percent.  That is, conduit financing costs less in terms of 
interest rates. This finding is different from the results of Robbins and Simonsen (2012), 
where they report that “The bonds sold to issue debt through these JPAs carried, on 
average and all else equal, interest costs 24 basis points higher and issuance costs 33 
percent greater than what would be expected for the same issues sold directly by a local 
government.” This article by Robbins and Simonsen (2012), however, does not consider 
the endogenous nature of debt financing choice. That is, local agencies do not randomly 
choose conduit financing or direct issuance, and they make these decisions based on their 
specific background. Thus, my study addresses this problem through a two stages 
analysis. Surprisingly, enhancement is not associated with lower TIC.  Enhancement is, 
of course, not random. 
10 It is similar in concept to psychology latent scales such as intelligence or depression, or in politics the 
strength of support for a candidate, which is expressed by voting one way or another.  The propensity score 
is estimated from the probit and then used as a standard IV in the regression for TIC. 
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Table 3.8 Instrumental Variables (2SLS) Regression of Interest Costs Model 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
 
Number of obs = 5,288 
   
Wald chi2(23) = 3095.64 
   
Prob > chi2 = 0 
   
R-squared = 0.1845 
   
Root MSE = 1.2202 
TIC Coefficient 
Standard 
Error z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
Marks-Roos bond indicator -3.665 1.025 -3.58 <0.001 -5.674 -1.656 
Bond Buyer Revenue Bond 
Index 1.027 0.042 24.63 <0.001 0.945 1.109 
Competitive sale -0.368 0.046 -7.95 <0.001 -0.458 -0.277 
Natural log of principal 
amount -0.049 0.014 -3.57 <0.001 -0.077 -0.022 
Natural log of year to 
maturity 0.784 0.038 20.85 <0.001 0.710 0.858 
Refunding bond -0.152 0.073 -2.07 0.039 -0.296 -0.008 
callable -0.027 0.040 -0.67 0.503 -0.105 0.051 
enhancement 0.428 0.076 5.63 <0.001 0.279 0.578 
Bond ratings 
      AAA -2.887 0.615 -4.69 <0.001 -4.093 -1.682 
AA -2.724 0.614 -4.44 <0.001 -3.928 -1.520 
A -1.939 0.615 -3.15 0.002 -3.145 -0.733 
BBB -1.874 0.624 -3.00 0.003 -3.096 -0.651 
Not rated -1.533 0.637 -2.41 0.016 -2.782 -0.284 
Debt Type 
      General obligation bond 0.431 0.136 3.17 0.002 0.165 0.698 
Limited tax obligation bond -0.116 0.255 -0.46 0.649 -0.616 0.384 
Marks-Roos Authority Loan 3.689 0.923 4.00 <0.001 1.881 5.497 
Special assessment bond 0.527 0.120 4.40 <0.001 0.292 0.762 
Tax allocation bond 0.690 0.100 6.93 <0.001 0.495 0.885 
Issuer Group 
      Counties -0.204 0.083 -2.46 0.014 -0.367 -0.042 
K-14 Schools -0.396 0.094 -4.20 <0.001 -0.581 -0.211 
Mello-Roos 1.062 0.272 3.91 <0.001 0.530 1.595 
Special Districts -0.255 0.062 -4.11 <0.001 -0.376 -0.133 
UC & CSU 0.663 0.411 1.61 0.107 -0.142 1.468 
Constant 0.521 0.686 0.76 0.448 -0.825 1.866 
*Note:  in the dummy variable"rating"group, rating lower than BBB are omitted; other  in 
the dummy variable"Debt Type"group, other debt types except the four group that listed 
here are omitted  
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Besides TIC, I also investigate issuance costs in detail, that is, fees paid to 
financial teams. Interestingly, when examine the effect of conduit financing on Issuance 
cost, I found the opposite result. As shown in table 3.9, this model use “Issuance cost per 
principal amount” as the dependent variable, and all independent variables identified in 
TIC model, which is the common method used in other literature. The coefficient of the 
dummy variable “Marks-Roos bond indicator” is positive and significant. It suggests that 
controlling for other factors, conduit bonds pay more issuance fee by an average of 8.734 
percent than other bonds in the sample. That is, conduit financing costs more in terms of 
issuance costs per principal amount of bond issues. This finding is consistent with the 
result in Robbins and Simonsen (2012) who find issuance cost of Marks-Roos bonds is 
33 percent greater than expected fee for the same issues sold directly by a local 
government, although the effect is much smaller.  
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Table 3.9 Instrumental Variables (2SLS) Regression of Issuance Cost Per Principal 
Amount 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
 
Number of obs = 4,735 
   
Wald chi2(22) = 969.75 
   
Prob > chi2 = 0 
   
R-squared = 0.0099 
   
Root MSE = 3.9983 
Issue Costs Pct of 
Principal Amt Coefficient 
Standard 
Error z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Marks-Roos bond indicator 8.734 3.475 2.51 0.012 1.923 15.545 
Bond Buyer Revenue Bond 
Index -0.597 0.124 -4.80 <0.001 -0.841 -0.353 
Competitive sale -0.984 0.158 -6.21 <0.001 -1.295 -0.674 
Natural log of principal 
amount -1.116 0.051 -22.07 <0.001 -1.215 -1.017 
Natural log of year to 
maturity 0.374 0.134 2.80 0.005 0.112 0.636 
Refunding bond -1.031 0.221 -4.67 <0.001 -1.464 -0.598 
callable 0.214 0.139 1.54 0.124 -0.059 0.487 
enhancement 1.226 0.266 4.61 <0.001 0.705 1.747 
Bond ratings 
      AAA -1.413 2.320 -0.61 0.543 -5.961 3.135 
AA -0.105 2.320 -0.05 0.964 -4.651 4.441 
A -0.126 2.325 -0.05 0.957 -4.683 4.432 
BBB -0.597 2.351 -0.25 0.799 -5.206 4.011 
Not rated -3.742 2.370 -1.58 0.114 -8.388 0.903 
Debt Type 
      General obligation bond -1.343 0.423 -3.18 0.001 -2.172 -0.514 
Limited tax obligation bond -2.967 0.870 -3.41 0.001 -4.672 -1.262 
Marks-Roos Authority Loan 0.000 (omitted) 
    Special assessment bond 1.148 0.403 2.85 0.004 0.358 1.938 
Tax allocation bond -0.815 0.332 -2.45 0.014 -1.466 -0.164 
Issuer Group 
      Counties -0.287 0.287 -1.00 0.317 -0.850 0.275 
K-14 Schools 0.115 0.300 0.38 0.701 -0.473 0.704 
Mello-Roos 3.096 0.985 3.14 0.002 1.165 5.026 
Special Districts -0.690 0.255 -2.70 0.007 -1.190 -0.190 
UC & CSU -0.247 1.429 -0.17 0.863 -3.048 2.554 
Constant 24.703 2.570 9.61 <0.001 19.665 29.741 
Instrumented: MRB 
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*Note:  in the dummy variable"rating"group, rating lower than BBB are omitted; other  in 
the dummy variable"Debt Type"group, other debt types except the four group that listed 
here are omitted 
Conclusions and Implications 
In this research, I investigate two questions: what drives local agencies to use 
conduits, and whether interest costs of conduit bonds are significantly reduced. MRBs in 
California are used as an example.  As an alternative way to issue bonds, conduit 
financing has been widely used by local governments and nonprofit companies and 
brings benefits to the organizations involved, such as flexibility and the potential 
reduction of borrowing costs due to economies of scale. Based analysis using data on 
MRBs during the year 1984 to 2016, I find that controlling for other factors, conduit 
bonds cost less by an average of 3.665 percent. Low-quality local agencies or small bond 
issues can potentially achieve lower borrowing costs through conduit financing. 
Borrowing cost, however, is not the only issue of local government borrowing. In spite of 
the benefits, conduit financing also provides a channel for avoiding voter approval and 
circulating debt limits. A large amount of MRBs are not rated, which means these bonds 
are not investigated by rating agencies. Bond pooling can involve several local agencies 
with different levels of fiscal conditions and distinct capital projects to finance. If keeping 
the debt burden of a local government within the debt repayment capacity is a desirable 
goal, conduit financing should definitely be appropriately and effectively regulated.  
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Chapter 4 Quasi-Municipal Bonds of Chinese Subnational Governments: 
Borrowing, Pricing and Fixed-Assets Expenditures 
Introduction 
With the acceleration of urbanization, the need to finance urban infrastructure is 
critical in many developing countries. Adequate financial resources supporting long-term 
urban infrastructure are necessary for economic development and enable the cities to 
better face the challenges of globalization (Attinasi & Brugnoli, 2001). Bond finance has 
been widely used in the U.S. as a relatively low cost direct financing option and 
increasingly is considered within developing countries. China has a long history of public 
bond financing, which could be traced back to the Qing Dynasty in the 19th Century 
based on maritime customs duties (Huang & Zhu, 2009). The growth of local government 
debts appeared in recent years, and the regulation of local debt is not clear.  In particular, 
the RMB four-trillion economic stimulus plan requires subnational governments to 
provide matching funds, which further increases subnational government debts. Growth 
has especially occurred for contingent debt, i.e. debts through financial vehicles launched 
by subnational governments, including the urban investment bond, which is also called 
quasi-municipal bond 11 . These financial vehicles help governments to build public 
infrastructure, provide various public services, and make contributions to social 
development.  
11 In the U.S.A., “municipal bond” refers to bonds issued by state and local governments and the interest on 
qualified municipal bonds is exempt from federal and most states income taxes. “Quasi-municipal bond” is 
a special category of Chinese bonds and is not tax-exempt. “Quasi-municipal bond” is used because these 
bonds are issued to fund public projects for local governments, but not the tax-exempt status.  
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As in other developing countries, governance in China is highly centralized, 
especially in the period of the planned economy. The central government made the 
investment decisions and mainly relied on “pay-as-you-go” financing, and the debt 
magnitude was relatively small, but things began to change since the reform of the 1980s. 
The Chinese central government gradually decentralized fiscal power. After Third 
Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1978, 
China began to carry out a comprehensive reform of the economic system. Adapt to 
demand of the economic system transition, the government financial management system 
has undergone major reforms and adjustments in 1980, 1985 and 1988. The 1994 fiscal 
reform of the tax sharing system basically established norms of fiscal power and service 
delivery responsibilities between the central and local governments.  The following tax 
reforms mainly aimed for the construction of public financial framework focusing on 
expenditure management reforms. As a matter of fact, revenue share of GDP of the 
subnational governments declined after the 1994 fiscal reform.   
The 1994 Budget Law forbade the subnational governments to run deficits and 
borrow from the direct bond market—they can borrow only from the central government 
and banks which are also under tight restrictions. The 1995 Guarantee Law forbade the 
subnational governments to provide guarantees for other entities’ borrowing transactions. 
For example, the subnational governments are not allowed to legally guarantee state-
owned companies’ borrowing. However, subnational governments’ demands gradually 
drove the change of the financing system. In order to fill the financial gap and bypass the 
legal restrictions, subnational governments have been heavily involved in contingent 
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debts “which are placed off-budget” (Jun Ma & Liu, 2005b)--these debts are not reported 
in the same way as other debts and Chinese budgeting and government accounting 
system did not officially provide any information about magnitude of these contingent 
debts. The central government was shocked by the rapid growth of the contingent debts. 
The central government issued a series of policies to regulate the contingent debts, while 
actively paving the way for subnational governments to access the bond market in 
appropriate ways. In this way, the central government controlled what it viewed as 
inappropriate financing while providing an acceptable alternative source of debt funding 
for subnational governments.   
Meanwhile, since the end of the 20th century, the central government launched a 
series of financial reforms to set up the credit system in a way to benefit the economy. A 
key reform transformed the credit system from a relationship basis to a market basis. The 
relationship-based system, “…as embraced by many Asian countries in the mid-1990s, is 
advantageous when policy goals are to shelter and develop young borrowers” (Martell, 
2003a).  The market-based system, “…as embraced by the US and other western 
countries, is advantageous when policymakers wish to design financing arrangements for 
municipalities such that arrangements are commensurate with municipal expenditure 
responsibilities and repayment capacities” (Martell, 2003a). 
Previous research on municipal debt either focuses on bond market issues in the 
U.S., or the theoretical debates on whether or not to allow the Chinese subnational 
governments to issue bonds. There are limited empirical studies on the market status of 
the Chinese bond market, and we are unaware of any study that examines the connections 
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among borrowing and investment by subnational governments. This research aims to fill 
this gap.  
This work addresses two questions: (1) In Chinese quasi-municipal credit markets, 
is there any evidence that the quasi-municipal bond market is partially influenced by 
market principles; for example, do bond pricing choices reflect borrower risk? (2) How 
are the borrowing price, the borrowing volume, and infrastructure expenditure 
interconnected? Using data from 2007 to 2012, through a simultaneous equation model, 
we find that the municipal credit system in China can be categorized as a mixture of 
relationship-based and market-based characteristics; the fiscal resources available and 
debt have a complementary relationship. Apparently, due to highly different credit 
systems in the U.S. and China, it is reasonable to expect distinct credit system operations, 
and the mechanisms that have been documented in the U.S. do not necessarily work well 
in China. At the moment, the central government is arranging extensive use of municipal 
bonds.  Concerns about financial vehicles, including lack of transparency and weak risk 
management of Chinese subnational governments, keep attracting and elevating attention 
from both academic and practical perspectives.  
Background 
The past decade is called the “the golden decade of China” because of the fast 
economic growth. According to the national bureau of statistics, the average annual 
growth of GDP of China in 2002-2011 is 10.2%, and the government expenditure is 
considered as a valuable contributor. However, China’s local governments’ debts 
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expanded as well. Especially from 2008 to 2009, the debt balance of local government 
rose sharply—growth rate is 61.92%.  The RMB 4 trillion (US$ 586 billion) economic 
stimulus plan includes RMB 2.8 trillion matching funds raised by local governments. 
Since there was a large gap between the local governments’ revenues and the matching 
funds, the central government encouraged local governments to broaden the financing 
channels. The central bank and China Banking Regulatory Commission put forward some 
solutions including conditional support of local governments to establish the funding 
platforms, issue urban investment bonds, medium-term notes and using other financing 
instruments12.  
        As the municipal credit market expanded, many of the Chinese local 
governments were burdened with heavy debt, and the new issues and concerns appeared, 
such as high debt ratio and inadequate repayment abilities. Therefore, the central 
government began a series of reforms to prevent the potential municipal debt crisis. Since 
then, China’s local government funding platforms (LGFP) became a priority social and 
economic issue. The subnational governments get access to the credit market through 
LGFPs by way of bank loans or enterprise bonds--urban investment bonds. Since the 
proceeds of these enterprise bonds are mainly used to finance the public projects or 
services, these bonds are also called quasi-municipal bonds. Compared to bank loans, 
quasi-municipal bonds have lots of advantages, such as a lower borrowing cost in a 
mature market. However, a more important reason for the Chinese central government 
actively promoting the municipal bond during recent years is that the bank has already 
12For more information, please see: the People’s Bank of China (central bank), China banking regulatory 
commission (CBRC). ‘Guidance about further strengthen the credit structure adjustment to promote stable 
and rapid economic development’ (Yin Jian Fa [2009] NO.92). March 2009. 
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borne heavy risk as the loans of subnational governments rapidly increased. Systematic 
financial risk might destroy the whole economy if large scale defaults happen, and 
already there are some signals of trouble, such as the growth in the volume of non-
performing loans13.      
    Current administrative divisions of China consist of four levels of subnational 
governments: the province, prefecture, county, and township. The provincial level 
includes autonomous region, province, municipality, and special administrative region. 
The higher levels have authority over the lower, for example, the provincial level 
governments have authority over other subnational administrative levels.  The central 
government has authority over all subnational governments. Since 1994, China 
implemented revenue-sharing financial management system 14 . From the expenditure 
perspective, the central government is in charge of national security, foreign affairs, and 
the central state operating activities. In addition, the central government is responsible for 
necessary expenditures that adjust the national economic structure, coordinate regional 
development, and the implement macro-control. Subnational governments are mainly 
responsible for the expenditures of the operation of subnational administrative 
departments and the region's economic development, such as support for agriculture, 
urban maintenance and construction funds, and local culture, education, health and other 
operating expenses.  
13 According to 2014 financial statements of banks, the volume of non-performing loans rose more than 30% 
in several large banks than in 2013, For example, the non-performing loans of Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China increased by 33% over the previous year, and non-performing loan ratio was 1.13%, which 
increased by 0.19%, rising for two consecutive years (For more information, please see 
http://wallstreetcn.com/node/215779). 
14 For more information about the government revenue and expenditure, please see the web site of Ministry 
of Finance of the People’s Republic of China (http://yss.mof.gov.cn/zhuantilanmu/zhongguocaizhengtizhi/).   
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The fiscal revenues are divided into three categories: the central tax, local tax and 
shared tax. (1) The central tax is the revenue of the central government, which aims to 
safeguard national interests and the implement macro-control policies for tariffs, 
consumption taxes, income tax of national owned corporations. (2) Shared taxes are 
shared by the central and subnational governments, which include taxes that are directly 
related to economic development, including value-added tax, resource tax, and securities 
transaction tax. (3) Local taxes consist of other taxes that are suitable for local collection, 
for example, business tax, income tax of local business, real estate tax, and personal 
income tax.  
Subnational governments get transfer payments from the central government in 
addition to the shared taxes and local taxes generated at the local level. There are two 
kinds of transfer payments: the general transfer payment and the special transfer payment. 
The general transfer payment is that the central government provides subsidies to 
subnational governments to compensate for financial inequities (primarily in the Midwest 
region). The special transfer payment refers to the subsidies that are earmarked for a 
particular purpose and are mainly used for education, social security and agriculture. 
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Figure 4.1 Revenue and Expenditure Proportion of the Central and Subnational governments 
 
 
 China’s Local Government Funding Platforms (LGFPs) 
The State Council defines the Local Government Funding Platforms (LGFPs) as 
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appropriation or asset injection (such as land, equity, etc.), specializing in funding, 
investing, constructing, and operating public or quasi-public projects commissioned by 
local governments (Guo, 2010). LGFP usually includes lots of specific purpose 
companies which are called urban investment companies such as Shanghai Urban 
Construction Investment and Development Corporation. The bonds issued by these urban 
investment companies are called urban investment bonds, which is viewed as quasi-
municipal bonds. He and Man(He & Man, 2012) provide further explanations: 
“These quasi-public agencies generally are incorporated as different investment 
companies in order to finance and invest as a commercial entity. The state and local 
governments backed these financing platforms by imputing hard assets, such as land, 
state-owned properties, and even revenue from fees and taxes. In other words, the state 
and local governments bear certain liabilities to pay for the debt if the financing 
platforms fail to meet their engagements. So these debts are considered to be the “hidden 
debt” of the SNGs although they are not included in the SNGs’ balance sheet.”15 
The actual controllers of the urban investment companies in the LGFPSs are the 
subnational governments and their subsidiaries, and most of the projects operated by 
them are nonprofit, although on the surface they often look like for-profit companies. 
They have the status of independent legal entities. Most of them are limited liability 
companies, including general trading companies such as construction investment 
companies and state-owned property operation companies, and industry investment 
companies such as water utility companies and transportation companies16. LGFP are 
usually supported by the subnational governments through financial appropriation or 
asset injection. Financial appropriation involves the authorization of fiscal resources. 
15 SNGs refer to local governments in this paper. 
16For more information, please see: Ministry of Finance, Development and Reform Commission, People's 
Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Commission. Notice about the implementation of the State 
Council on strengthening local government financing platform management related issues. FB [2010] No. 
412, July 30, 2010. 
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Asset injections are investments of nonfinancial assets such as land, stock rights or 
charge rights.  Each urban investment company will utilize a mix of financial 
appropriations and asset injection activities. The urban investment company provides 
public or quasi-public goods, such as constructing the public infrastructures and 
properties, supporting facilities, and public transportation17.  
One thing to emphasize here is that, despite of the status of independent legal 
entities, the urban investment companies gain the potential credit enhancements 
supported by the local governments; in other words, these entities integrate the 
government credits and commercial credits. In the original phases, the local governments 
usually inject assets to make the platforms bigger, and the local governments may also 
provide guarantee documents if necessary. LGFPs are creations of Chinese subnational 
governments and have different degrees of dependency on their parental governments.  
Plenty of literature discusses the causes for the debt expanding of the local 
governments and the emergence of LGFPs(Ba, 2009; China-Development-Review, 2010; 
Feng, 2014; Jiang & Xu, 2014; Jun Ma & Liu, 2005b) , and many of them agree the 
following points: since the reform of tax-sharing system in 1994, financing capacity of 
local governments is significantly constrained; in the Budget Law of 1994, local 
governments are prohibited from issuing local government bonds, except as otherwise 
prescribed by laws or the State Council; as a result, LGFPs came into being to provide 
finance for local infrastructure construction, and to boost economic growth. At the end of 
2010, there were 6,576 LGFPs. 
17Ebit. 
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Figure 4.2 Causes for Emergence of China’s Local Government Funding Platforms 
(LGFP)18 
 
Incentives of Subnational Government Officials to Borrow 
Governments are operated by public officials. Public administration theories 
generally suppose the government officials are rational decision makers. Why do 
subnational government officials choose debt finance? Based on Ma and Liu (2005) and 
the “reverse soft budget constraints” theory(Zhou, 2005), behaviors of subnational 
government officials can be explained from three perspectives: the institutional 
environment, incentive mechanism, and constraints(Jun Ma & Liu, 2005a).  
First, since the reform in 1978, China's ruling party began to establish the 
legitimacy of the ruling on the basis of economic development, although it has changed 
from the achievement view that emphasizing on economic growth alone to emphasizing 
both economic and social development. In addition, subnational governments operate in a 
fiscal decentralization system under an administrative centralization. After the reform of 
18 SNG refers to the subnational government, and LGFP refers to Local Government Funding Platforms. 
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tax-sharing system in 1994, lots of subnational governments had fiscal difficulties, 
especially in central and western regions. On the one hand, the legitimacy of the ruling 
requires performances; on the other hand, the available resources are limited. The 
institutional environment produces factors that induce the subnational governments break 
the budget constraints. Second, subnational governments consist of officers that pay 
attention to their professional and personal interests. Their salaries and other benefits are 
directly related to job position. The existing cadre promotion system is a typical 
"eliminated” system-- officials gradually promoted from the bottom to the top, and once 
an officer does not get promoted in a certain level, he loses the promotion opportunities 
to the higher level. This incentive mechanism induces local government officers 
concerning short-term achievement, and passing the achievement signals to the higher 
level governments through large-scale and resource-intensive investments and projects, 
such as roads and bridges, which is also effective and easily measured signals. Third, the 
institutional, social and creditor constraints are very weak(Jun Ma & Liu, 2005a).    
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Previous scholars categorized credit systems into two forms: relationship-based 
and market-based systems (Diamond, 1991; Peterson & Hammam, 1997; Rajan & 
Zingales, 1998). Financial intermediation, including relationship banks19 and credit rating 
agencies, “emerges as a natural institutional arrangement in an asymmetric information 
economy” (Martell, 2003a). 
19 In China, the banks are still largest investors in the enterprise bonds.  
66 
 
                                                 
Transactions could be made through relationship or market contracts. Based on  
transaction cost theory, relationship contracting is preferred when lack of information 
producing financial intermediation (credit rating agencies) and information verification is 
difficult; otherwise, market contracting has greater merit (Williamson, 1979a). In the 
relationship-based system, price may not closely associated with default risk, and 
“quantity adjustments have much better incentive-compatibility properties than do price 
adjustments” (Williamson, 1979b).   
In a relationship-based system, the financier (relationship bank) usually has 
monopoly power on the market. The entrance barriers come from regulation or a low 
degree of transparency (Rajan & Zingales, 1998).  In this case, the transaction is made 
through negotiations, and borrowing cost depends on bargaining power. Therefore, 
institutional relationships are very important, and a good relationship may lead to 
discounted borrowing prices or larger borrowing volume. The relationship-based system 
is particularly useful when the market is immature or the borrower lacks a good 
reputation (Diamond, 1991; Peterson & Hammam, 1997).  
In a market-based system, institutional relationship is not as important, since the   
transaction decision is determined by market competition, and the interest rate should 
reflect default risk. Credit rating agencies provide information to deal with information 
asymmetry problems. Various financiers make their investment decisions based on bonds 
ratings and other published information, and their investment returns are protected by 
contracts (Martell, 2003b).   
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Given the characteristics of two forms of credit systems, what should we expect? 
In the context of China, who is borrowing, how much do they pay, and does 
infrastructure demand drive the bond issuance? Further, based on the above evidence, 
after several decades of market reform, should this bond market be characterized as a 
market-based credit system? Focusing on these questions, this study examines the 
following hypotheses. 
H1: under a market-based credit system, borrowing cost is positively associated 
with default risk. 
H2: in a market-based credit system, subnational governments with higher 
repayment capacity and higher financing demands will issue more bonds.  
H3: annual fixed asset expenditures of a subnational government should be 
positively related to infrastructure demands and available resources, and negatively 
related to debt financing costs.20 
 H4: in a relationship-based municipal credit system, risk will not be completely 
expressed by prices. Therefore, some or all of the above hypotheses might fail. 
Methodology 
A municipal bond market with highly marketization degree should allocate the 
resources efficiently. High risk bonds will bear relatively high borrowing costs, and vice 
versa.  We are particularly interested in how urban investment bonds are priced, which 
20 Debt financing should include bonds and bank loans. However, because of data limitation, this paper only 
focuses on bond issuances. 
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partially captures the image of subnational governments’ debt financing. To our 
knowledge, limited research examines the question of what drives pricing of Chinese 
urban investment bonds and no empirical research exists addressing the relationships 
between the pricing, borrowing and fixed asset expenditures. Yihe Qian and Xuejun Jin 
use data of medium-term notes excluding urban investment bonds find that the inter-bank 
bond market already has a reasonable risk pricing capability(Qian & Jin, 2013). Qi et al 
(2012) using data of several kinds of urban investment bonds in 2009, found that the 
credit spread of the Chinese urban investment bonds significantly associated with asset 
sizes of issuing corporations, the per capita GDP of the regions that the corporation 
located, interest rates of reference corporation bonds, and guarantee utilization(Qi, Ge, & 
Meng, 2012).  Ma and Yang (2013) found that the type of financial backing on  urban 
investment bonds has a significant impact on the credit spread(Jinhua Ma & Yang, 2013). 
In the following section, a more comprehensive model is developed to estimate the risk 
premium of an urban investment bond and test the relationships. All equations and 
variables are described.       
Simultaneous equations models require identification assumptions.  In this model, 
the risk premium, annual new issuance of bonds, and fixed assets expenditure are 
simultaneously determined.   
The assumptions here are summarized as follows (endogenous variables are in 
italics).  (1) The revenue ratio, bond rating, GDP, maturity, par value and previous bond 
issuances affect risk premium.  (2)  The risk premium, GDP, margin, urban, and previous 
bond issuances affect both the annual new issuance and fixed-Assets expenditures.  (3) 
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Annual new issuance and fixed-Assets expenditures affect each other because money is 
required to build assets, while the availability of borrowing increases the size of 
infrastructure projects.    
Determinants of Risk Premium (Equation 1) 
The risk premium is the difference between coupon rate of an urban investment 
bond and risk-free lending rate21. The risk premium is viewed as determined by the 
issuer’s fiscal capacity, the feature of a bond, and macroeconomic conditions (Cook, 
1982; Dwight V. Denison, Yan, & Zhao, 2007; Liu & Thakor, 1984; Simonsen, Robbins, 
& Helgerson, 2001). Studies have found that issuers with better fiscal capacities tend to 
get lower risk premium. In this study, the ratio of annual revenue to expenditure 
(Revratio)22 is used to capture the fiscal capacity of each province or direct-controlled 
municipality.  
We consider some futures of a particular bond issue related to default risk that 
have been documented in previous literature (D. V. Denison, 2001; Dwight V. Denison, 
2012; Hsueh & Kidwell, 1988; Qi et al., 2012; Qian & Jin, 2013). Higher bond credit 
ratings imply higher credit quality and lower default risk. Accordingly, the bond market 
requires higher risk premium for the lower rating bonds. Longer maturity is generally 
associated with higher risk because “a bond with longer maturity is less liquid and is 
vulnerable to interest rate risk. Municipal bonds may be less susceptible to changes in the 
business cycle than corporate bonds, but the risk of municipal revenue bonds backed by 
21 This study uses the interest rate of the Treasury bill in the year that the urban investment bond was issued 
as the risk-free lending rate. 
22 The expenditure includes both current and capital expenditure of each province or direct-controlled 
municipality.  
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elastic revenues such as the sales and income taxes will oscillate with the business 
cycle"( D. V. Denison, 2001). 
Determinants of Annual New Issuance (Equation 2) 
In a market-based credit system, the annual debt issuance (D) should depend on 
the repayment capacity and debt financing demands. The operation margin (Margin) and 
economic condition (GDP) are used to capture repayment capacity of the subnational 
governments. Borrowing price and previous bond issuance represent debt management. 
Issuers that face higher risk premiums are expected issue less bonds. Furthermore, local 
annual fixed asset expenditures and urbanization represent the demands for capital and 
should drive debt issuance into higher volume. 
Determinants of Annual Fixed Asset Expenditures (Equation 3) 
Annual Fixed Asset Expenditures (I) depends on infrastructure demands, 
available funding, borrowing costs, and previous fixed asset expenditures. General 
operating expenditure is considered as the lowest expenditure requirements to operate a 
government agency; operating margin is calculated by ratio of the difference between 
revenue and general operation expenditure over revenue. The higher the general 
operating expenditure, the lower the resources left for fixed asset expenditures. 
Urbanization reflects infrastructure demand, and should be positively associated with 
fixed asset expenditure. GDP, annual new bond issuance, and previous debt reflect the 
available resources, which should be positively correlated with fixed asset expenditures. 
Borrowing price should reduce borrowing. Investment is highly auto-correlated, 
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presumably because investment takes time. Bond rating is in categories, which works as 
well as rating being a scale (note the monotonicity). 
More specifically, the mathematical model is represented by the following 
simultaneous equations. Risk premium (R), annual new issuance (D), and annual fixed 
asset expenditures (I) are endogenous variables; other variables are exogenous.  Note that 
financial data are in units of RMB 100,000,000 and that in the last ten years, the yuan-
dollar exchange rate has been between 6.0 and 8.0 Yuan per dollar since 2005. This 
model is identified by Urban not being in R, and bond ratings not in the second & third 
equations, and lagged investment only in investment itself, where the coefficient is not 
significantly different from 1.0.   
R=fn (-Revratio, -bondAAA, -bondAA+, +bondAA-, +bondA+, -GDP, +Maturity, 
+Parvalue, +Debtprev) + ɛ23                                                                (1) 
D=fn (+I, +Margin, -R, +GDP, +Urban, -Debtprev) + ɛ                         (2) 
I=fn (+lagged I, +Urban, +GDP, +D, -R, +Debtprev, +Margin) + ɛ      (3)  
Data Analysis and Empirical Findings 
Data used in this study is collected from two main sources. First is the Wind 
database, which is a comprehensive financial database including detailed information for 
bonds and stocks. Since there are only a few bond issuances before 2007, and including 
lots of missing data, this study uses the data from January 2007 to December 2012.  The 
Wind database provides information about the coupon rate, the issuer, the maturity, the 
23 Bonds with credit rating AA are used as the reference group, and hence omitted in the formula.   
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credit rating, and the par value. The interest rates of treasury bills also come from the 
Wind database, and then the risk premium is calculated by subtracting the risk-free rate. 
The average bond yield of the one-year treasury bill is viewed as the risk-free security, in 
particular the average bond yields of the one-year treasury bill at the year the bond was 
issued, to capture the market condition at that time. 
The repayment ability is believed to be a very important factor and directly 
influences the bond yields if the market is efficient, but how to measure the repayment 
ability is a difficult question. One method is to examine the financial condition of each 
direct issuer of enterprise bonds, but since most urban investment enterprises are unlisted, 
it is difficult to collect their financial statements. Available financial reports show that 
few of them earn enough income from their own operation to pay off bonds—a large 
portion of them pay debts by subsidy or transformed funding from the parent subnational 
governments(Qi et al., 2012). Therefore this study measures repayment capacity by fiscal 
conditions of these subnational governments. Government fiscal information comes from 
the China National Bureau of Statistics. There are 1314 observations, including most of 
the bonds issued through the financial vehicles. Among 31 provinces and direct-
controlled municipalities, 30 of them issued urban investment bonds, although the debt 
levels are quite different.  
The model is estimated by three-stage least-squares regression, but we also 
considered two-stage least-squares estimation and the overall conclusions remain 
unchanged. Table 4.1 shows the results of the simultaneous equations. All of the three 
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equations are statistically significant at p<0.001. The r2 is 0.2639, 0.8321, and 0.9748 
respectively.  
 The results suggest that there is some evidence for market-based borrowing. The 
findings are discussed in context of the hypotheses previously discussed.  The interest 
rate is positively associated with default risk which is consistent with a market-based 
system [Hypothesis #1]. Risk premium is negatively correlated with annual new issuance 
(coefficient is -34.34), suggesting that borrowing price significantly affects how much 
they are borrowing.  Bond credit ratings significantly affect the risk premium—the higher 
the credit ratings, the less the issuer paid. Both maturity and previous debt are 
significantly and positively correlated with risk premium, indicating that the market price 
reflects default risks. However, par value is negatively and significantly associated with 
risk premium. The market-based theory states that larger par-values imply greater default 
risk and therefore associated with higher risk premium. The positive coefficient of par 
value may suggest the existence of quantity discount or economies to scale and is 
consistent with the transaction cost theory observed by Martell (Martell, 2003a) 
Hypothesis two posits that subnational governments with higher repayment 
capacity and higher financing demands issue more bonds. Subnational governments with 
healthier fiscal conditions measured by credit ratings and higher GDP have lower risk 
premiums on average. Lower risk premiums are associated with more annual debt 
issuance. Higher risk premiums are associated with lesser amounts of annual new bond 
issuance.       
74 
 
Hypothesis three posits that the annual fixed asset expenditures of a subnational 
government are positively related to infrastructure demands and available resources, and 
negatively related to debt financing costs. The borrowing price, the annual bond issuance, 
and the fixed asset expenditure by the subnational governments are interconnected; more 
fixed asset expenditure leads to more annual bond issuance; and the lower the borrowing 
price, the larger the amount of bonds issued. Fixed asset expenditure and bond issuance 
are significantly explained by each other, which suggests that the urban investment bonds 
contribute to public fixed asset expenditure, and meanwhile bond issuance is driven by 
demand for infrastructure financing, which supports the market-based hypothesis.  
Hypothesis four states that risk will not be completely reflected by prices in a 
relationship-based municipal credit system. Economic condition and the operating margin 
are negatively and significantly associated with annual bond issuance. This finding is 
counter to the market-based hypothesis but is consistent with the pecking-order theory 
where organizations prefer to use their earnings to finance business activities and thus use 
less debt capital. Previous bond issuance is highly correlated with annual new issuance, 
which is also counter to market-based system expects. Due to risk management concerns, 
the regulatory authority tightened the debt financing rules since 2009, but also promoted 
the smooth completion of old projects of LGFP. The subnational governments that issued 
more bonds previously tend to issuance more. One explanation could be follow-up 
funding requirement of LGFP projects and those regions burdened with debts are most in 
need.  Another explanation could be familiarity of bond financing and good reputation 
establishment. 
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Fixed asset expenditures exhibits mixed evidences of market-based system. 
Positive coefficients of GDP, Margin and annual debt issuance suggest that regions with 
more available resources tend to spend more on investment in fixed assets. However, 
counter to market-based theory, the fixed asset expenditure is positively associated with 
borrowing prices and negatively related to urbanization. Fixed asset expenditure is highly 
auto-correlated, presumably because investment takes time.  
In summary, the empirical results indicate mixed evidence. Even after several 
financial reforms, the Chinese credit system cannot be categorized fully as a market-
based system. The relationship-based characteristics still exist. Deeper market reforms 
may decrease concerns for funding allocation and efficiency. 
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Table 4.1024Results of Three-stage Least Squares Estimation 
   
Risk Premium (R) (%)   
Revenue ratio(%) -0.905*** (-5.56) 
Bond AAA -1.215*** (-15.02) 
Bond AA+ -0.236*** (-5.36) 
Bond AA- 0.548*** (3.60) 
Bond A+ 1.193* (2.39) 
GDP(trillion) 0.0125 (0.46) 
Maturity(year) 0.0470** (3.06) 
Par value(100 million) -0.0167*** (-4.32) 
Debt previous(100 million) 0.000271*** (3.50) 
Constant 4.728*** (35.48) 
   
Annual Bond New Issuance (D)  
(100 million) 
  
Risk premium (%) -34.34** (-3.13) 
Fixed asset expenditures(100 million) 0.0147*** (8.13) 
GDP(trillion) -0.00324*** (-3.79) 
Margin (%) -476.3*** (-4.75) 
Urban (%) 0.306 (0.44) 
Debt previous(100 million) 0.793*** (45.67) 
Constant 467.8*** (5.86) 
   
Fixed Asset Expenditures (I) 
(100 million) 
  
Lagged fixed asset expenditures(100 million) 0.996*** (69.04) 
Annual bond new issuance(100 million) 3.578*** (6.27) 
Risk premium (%) 243.8*** (3.96) 
GDP(trillion) 0.0596*** (12.77) 
Margin (%) 2183.6*** (3.39) 
Urban (%) -22.11*** (-5.71) 
Debt previous(100 million) -2.387*** (-5.15) 
Constant -1077.5* (-2.07) 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
Note: sample size = 1314, and all equations are statistically significant at p<0.0001.  The 
r2 is 0.2639, 0.8321, and 0.9748for R, D, I, but the r2 is not maximized in this estimation. 
 
24 Most of financial data are in units of 100 million Yuan except GDP, and that in the last ten years, the 
yuan-dollar exchange rate has been between 6.0 and 8.0 Yuan per dollar since 2005. 
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Conclusion and Discussion 
In the U.S., a relatively mature market-based credit system has been formed for 
state and local governments. The story is different in China. The high GDP growth was 
maintained in China over the last 10 years, even during the financial crisis. However, 
subnational government debt is increasing rapidly. Although the previous budgetary law 
forbade subnational governments from directly issuing municipal bonds, many of them 
are burdened with heavy debts, primarily issued through financial vehicles. These 
financial vehicles help governments to build public infrastructure and provide various 
public services. However, as subnational debt increases, concerns about the Chinese 
credit system and the whole economy become more serious. This paper examines the 
market characteristics of the credit system, and empirical results indicate that the quasi-
municipal credit system in China can be characterized as a mixture of relationship-based 
and market-based characteristics. The fiscal resources available and debt have a 
complementary relationship.  
Possible policy implications may be drawn from our analysis. Since the credit 
system is still highly relationship based, the central government should promote the legal 
financing mechanism based on bond financing to enhance transparency so that debt 
management of subnational governments could be under public scrutiny and increase 
incentives to improve debt management.  
Due to the data limitations, this work does not include measurements of bank 
loans, intergovernmental transfers, and administrative management ability. In order to 
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capture a more comprehensive picture of funding allocation, further studies should 
consider these perspectives.   
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Chapter 5 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Introduction 
As a finance instrument, municipal bonds played a pivotal role on financing 
public works, make more resources available for states and locals to build their 
infrastructures and capital projects,  and potentially stimulating the economy of the 
society. Municipal bonds typically come in two forms: the general obligation bond (GO 
bond) and the revenue bond, which is secured by the full faith and credit of the issuer, or 
backed by a specific source of revenue. Along with the development of public 
administration strategy and financial technology, municipal bonds have become abundant 
and diverse that appeared various categories and providing different financing methods. 
Among them, the conduit debt financing, which allows one entity to issue debts on behalf 
of one or multiple governments, has been used by local governments as an alternative 
financing vehicle. Although local governments need not borrow from conduits--they can 
approach investors directly by issuing municipal bonds, conduit financing is compelling 
to some local agencies that they believe it provides extra benefits.  
In the state of California in the U.S., a local agency is allowed to borrow through 
a joint powers agency (JPA); in China, various Chinese local government issued debts 
through the local government financial vehicles (LGFV). Both JPA and LGFV serve as 
conduits. Conduit financing is preferred by local agencies in certain circumstances 
because it is more convenient or fixed issuance costs can be split between several conduit 
borrowers through bond pooling. Conduit financing is intended to provide flexibility to 
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local governments at reduced borrowing costs. However, conduit financing has been 
accused of circumventing state regulations imposed in the local governments for a long 
time, and the previous studies find no significant borrowing costs saving compared the 
conduit bonds to similar revenue bonds. Why does conduit financing still have great 
vitality? In this dissertation I examine debts of local governments issued through conduits 
in the context of the U.S. and China, particularly paying attention to Marks-Roos bonds 
and Chinese urban investment bonds.  
Chapter 2 provides a background context and foundation for the whole 
dissertation.  The chapter reviews the background context and provides analysis of 
motivation for using conduits and key characteristics. MRBs and UIBs are compared to 
identify the similarity and distinctive perspectives of the two mechanisms. It is intended 
to provide an objective picture of how conduit financing has been used and to facilitate 
deliberations over costs and benefits of using conduit financing. Then there are two 
chapters that empirically examine two examples of the conduit bonds market and interest 
costs of local governments. Chapter 3 investigates the Marks-Roos bonds in California, 
and chapter 4 investigates Chinese urban investment bonds. Based on data from 
California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC), chapter 3 of my 
dissertation addresses two issues: (1) what drives local agencies to use conduit? (2) Did 
conduit financing produce lower true interest costs than other revenue bonds? During the 
borrowing process, the JPA efficiently reorganizes small issues as a financial 
intermediary. Sophisticated local agencies with strong backgrounds prefer to issue 
municipal bonds directly. A two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression are used to avoid 
selection bias and potential endogeneity problems. The econometric model and results 
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suggest that ceteris paribus, TIC of California local governments are significantly 
reduced through conduit financing compared to in the absence of this choice. Chapter 4 
focuses on Chinese local government debts issued through the local government financial 
vehicles (LGFV). Specifically, this chapter addresses two questions: (1) in Chinese quasi-
municipal credit markets, is there any evidence that the quasi-municipal bond market is 
influenced by market principles? (2) How are borrowing price, borrowing volume, and 
infrastructure expenditure interconnected? Using data from 2007 to 2012, through a 
simultaneous equation model, I found that the municipal credit system in China has the 
mixed characteristics of relationship-based and market-based systems; and that the 
available fiscal resources and debt have a complementary relationship.  
Contributions to the Literature 
To my knowledge, there are very few studies that consider the drivers of local 
governments’ debt financing choices and empirically examine the impact of conduit 
financing on their borrowing costs. This dissertation contributes to three streams of 
literature. The first is the literature on municipal finance concerned about local 
governments. Although research on state government debt is vast, local government debt 
financing receives less attention. A number of local governments bear heavy service 
obligations but have limited revenue resources. Debt financing is of importance to those 
municipalities without sufficient revenues to support the demand of public expenditures. 
This dissertation contributes to this stream of literature in that it presents the evidence on 
borrowing costs savings through conduit financing compared to the instances where 
conduit financing is not used.  
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The second stream of literature is that of conduit financing. The majority of 
literature on conduit financing is concerned with taxing multijurisdictional corporations 
or arbitrage in the financial market, and tax-exempt bonds used for private activities. This 
dissertation shows that some municipalities prefer to use conduit financing, and it can 
have a positive effect in the case of fair use.  
The third stream of literature that this dissertation contributes to is that of research 
methods. Prior research has used OLS regressions to investigate TIC of Marks-Roos 
bonds and Chinese urban investment bonds, which ignore potential selection bias and 
endogeneity problems. When addressing these econometrics problems with 2SLS or 
simultaneous equation models, the resulting estimations present new evidence that differs 
significantly from previous studies.          
Future Research 
While this dissertation has enriched the literature with several analyses, it also 
presents abundant opportunities for future research. One potential direction is to expand 
the scope of this study to predict municipalities’ financing choices. Debt issuing is a 
complex process and requires lots of resource and time. Government officials make 
financing decisions by integrating their fiscal, political and social constraints. Thus, other 
factors, such as transaction costs, debt limits, and political environments might be also 
important. In addition, clearer identifications for debtors’ qualities and issuer 
sophistication should be explored. Or, instead of investigating borrowing costs, it could 
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be productive to examine the effect of conduit financing on infrastructure construction, 
property values, and economic development.  
Policy Implications 
Conduit financing provides an alternative way for local governments to finance 
public works. The conduit works as a financial intermediary between conduit borrowers 
and investors by producing information, providing loose certification and potential 
enhancement, and thereby potentially reducing costs. This section discusses policy 
implications from several perspectives. 
First of all, MRBs require local agencies to prove that the issuances of debts will 
lead to significant public benefits, which can range from “demonstrable savings in 
effective interest rate” and “bond preparation, bond underwriting, or bond issuance costs,” 
to “significant reductions in effective user charges levied by a local agency,” 
“employment benefits from undertaking the project in a timely fashion,” and “more 
efficient delivery of local agency services to residential and commercial development 
(Lockyer, 2006).” These requirements force borrowers to examine public benefits prior to 
issuing new debt, and debts that cannot meet this requirement will be denied. This 
potentially increases the rationality and justifiability of carrying public debts. 
Second, the results in Chapter 3 suggest that MRBs may produce lower interest 
costs. This is important given that most local governments carry heavy debts and their 
revenues are limited compared to their obligated expenditures. By saving funding from 
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reduced interest costs, local governments may provide services in other aspects and 
therefore taxpayers may also benefit from the conduit financing.      
Third, JPAs typically have financing teams and are responsible for the structure of 
financing, including documentation, and thus might reduce the search costs for local 
agencies. If local agencies enter a bond pool, they might also get lower issuance costs due 
to the economies of scale. 
Fourth, research costs for investors could be significant, especially for the 
individual investors. With the screening and monitoring of JPAs, the research costs of 
investors might be reduced. Because of the repeated cooperation between JPAs and local 
agencies, the research costs of JPAs might also be reduced, which improves the 
efficiency of bond issuance processes. 
 Fifth, MRBs provide diversification for investors. The diversification of security 
portfolios benefits investors through lower risks and higher yields. MRBs generally pay 
higher interest rates than general obligation bonds with AAA credit ratings. A number of 
MRBs are not rated. Due to the screening and certification of JPAs, MRBs could be an 
investment option for those investors interested in high yield securities.   
For a long time, as Chinese local governments’ investment and financing platform, 
the urban investment companies have the shells of marketed enterprises along with the 
essence of the government platform, and exercise finance functions of government 
projects in the name of the enterprises, Under the background that local governments 
were not allowed to issue municipal bonds before the implementation of the new budget 
law in 2015, the urban investment companies are regarded as Chinese "municipal bonds" 
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alternatives. Note that the market investors believe that the urban investment bonds are 
significantly less risky than bonds of the ordinary enterprises as a result of local 
governments pledging support.  
Recognizing the default risk of urban investment bonds, the central government 
adopted a series of measures to promote the standardization of local government bonds in 
recent years. On the one hand, local governments are allowed to issue municipal bonds 
within the debt limits; on the other hand, the Ministry of Finance explicitly promotes 
market transformation of urban investment companies. Unlike earlier urban investment 
debts, most of the new debts should not be identified as local government debts, but are 
legally debts of urban investments companies, and safety should be questioned. However, 
urban investment bonds with new low yields are still in high demand. An important 
reason is that there is excess demand resulting from excessive of cash while limited 
supply of quality credits, and investors have different views about the credits of urban 
investment companies since the standards and methods of local governments to process 
the debts are not uniform. During exploration of the model of cooperation between 
government and enterprises in recent years, urban investment bonds will still play an 
important role. Promoting marketization of urban investment debts, enhancing the 
transparency of the market, and further improving professional of issuers and investors 
will facilitate efficiency of the capital market and also protect investors.       
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Appendix: Background of Chinese Urban Investment Bonds 
The past decade is called the “the golden decade of China” because of the fast 
economic growth. According to the national bureau of statistics, the average annual 
growth of GDP of China in 2002-2011 is 10.2%, and the government investment is 
considered as a valuable contributor. Although the growth rates of lots of countries were 
very low in 2008 and 2009, under China's 4 trillion yuan stimulus plan launched by the 
central government in 2008, China’s GDP growth still maintained 9.6% and 9.1% 
respectively, indicating the power of the government investment. It’s generally believed 
that the government investment contributed to China’s rapid economic development over 
the past decade. The local governments’ investments have played a very important role in 
China’s local economic development.25 
However, China’s municipal credit market expanded as well. Especially from 
2008 to 2009, the debt balance of local government rose sharply—growth rate is 
61.92%.26 The 4 trillion yuan economic stimulus plan includes 2.8 trillion yuan matching 
funds raised by local governments. Since there was a large gap between the local 
governments’ revenues and the matching funds, the central government encouraged local 
governments to broaden the financing channels which included issuing more bonds. 
The municipal bond market has developed substantially in the U.S. since the 
1800s. The municipal bonds are issued by state and local governments to “finance 
infrastructure and capital projects (Dwight, 2012).” Unlike in China, the growth of the 
25 In this paper, China’s local governments refer to all levels’ government agencies except the central 
government. 
26 National Audit Office of China, 2011 No. 35: the national local government debt audit results 
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municipal bond market in the U.S. is relatively stable. Except slight fluctuations in 
certain years, in general, the U.S municipal debt outstanding is in a state of slow growth. 
The municipal bond market in the U.S. is much more mature and the regulation and 
management mechanism is more comprehensive. 
Although old China's stock market has a long history, after the founding of 
People's Republic of China, the government agencies in all levels rarely issued bonds and 
the entire security market was closed from 1952-1981. The first stock market is the 
Treasure bond market. In 1981, the central government began to issue treasury bills, 
which marked the development of China's securities market entering a new historical 
stage. However, the Budget Law prohibited local governments to issue bonds directly on 
concerns of repayment abilities of local governments.27Two approaches to borrowing 
from credit market have been developed in order to address temporary financial capital 
shortages of local governments: “Proxy Treasure Bond” and “city investment bonds” (He 
and Man, 2012). The city investment bonds are also called quasi-municipal bonds. 
Proxy Treasure Bond 
The process of debt financing for local government has evolved over the past 
decades. In 1998, the Asian Financial Crisis was raging and the storm swept many 
countries in Asia. The State Council decided to issue treasury bonds by the Ministry and 
lend money to local governments for local economic and social development projects. 
“The issue process of such bond is exactly the same as the Treasure Bond and the 
27 According to the 28th paragraph of the Law of Budgeting, the local governments should not issue 
municipal bond, except as otherwise provided in the law and the state council (China’s debt). Although the 
new budget law implemented in 2015 has relaxed the restrictions.  
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distribution of the revenue raised by such bond depended on the negotiations among the 
central government with each provincial government (He and Man, 2012).” 
Another issuing peak appeared during the Global Financial Crisis. In 2009 the 
State Council agreed that the Ministry of Finance issued 200 billion yuan local bonds on 
behalf of local governments and must be disclosed in the provincial budget, which can be 
viewed as a facility move of local governments’ issuing municipal bonds. The Ministry 
of Finance issued bonds on behalf of local governments and they paid the debt through 
the Ministry of Finance as well. These bonds are named “2009 XX Province/autonomous 
regions/municipalities/separately listed cities government bonds (XX period).”  
The pilot program could be viewed as a big progress. Since 2011, Shanghai, 
Guangdong and four other provinces were approved by the State Council to carry out 
their own bonds as pilots, and the pilots expanded to six provinces in 2013. Currently, 
only four provinces published information of local self-bonds in this year and the total 
amount have reached 50 billion yuan, showing a breakthrough in both the bond sizes and 
issuing form. The local self-bond is the transition from bonds that the central government 
issues as a proxy and the actual municipal bonds that are completely issued by the local 
governments. The "pilot approach of local self-bond in 2013" announced by the Ministry 
of Finance further clarified in underwriting and bidding.28   
28 Full content could be seen here: (June 25,2013) 
http://gks.mof.gov.cn/zhengfuxinxi/gongzuodongtai/201307/t20130704_948951.html 
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Urban Investment Bonds and LGFP  
The 4 trillion yuan economic stimulus plan includes 2.8 trillion yuan matching 
funds raised by local governments. Since there was a large gap between the local 
governments’ revenues and the matching funds, the central bank and China Banking 
Regulatory Commission put forward some solutions including conditional support of 
local governments to establish the funding platforms, issue enterprise bonds, medium-
term notes and using other financing instruments to broaden the financing channels29. 
This kind of bond is called a “quasi-municipal bond.” As the municipal credit market 
expanded, many of the Chinese local governments were burdened with heavy debt, and 
the new issues and concerns appeared, such as high debt ratio and inadequate repayment 
abilities. Therefore, the central government began a series of reforms to prevent the 
potential municipal debt crisis. Since then, China’s local government funding platforms 
became a priority social and economic issue. At present, the regulatory supervision of 
quasi-municipal bonds in China is still in alignment with enterprise bonds, which is 
accused as ignoring the objective needs of the development of the municipal debt, and 
will bring potential economic risks to both the central and the local governments. 
The development of LGFPs went through the following several phases30: 
1980-1994 First phase of exploration 
29 The People’s Bank of China (central bank), China banking regulatory commission (CBRC). ‘Guidance 
about further strengthen the credit structure adjustment to promote stable and rapid economic development’ 
(Yin Jian Fa [2009] NO.92). March 2009. 
30For more information, please see: Shanghai Institute research group of state-owned capital operation. 
Shanghai local government investment and financing platform for investment and financing mechanism’s 
innovation research [J]. Shanghai Administration Institute, May 2012 Volume 13, No. 3, P59-70.  
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In the 1980s, Guangdong province for the first time tried to construct roads by a 
loan and pay the principal and interest by the road toll. In 1988, the State Council of 
China proclaimed the reform plan of the investment management system: transform from 
appropriation to loan to construct the basic infrastructures. Six professional investment 
companies are established by the central government: energy, transportation, agriculture, 
raw material, forestry, and textiles, which is the original form of LGFPs (Zhao, 2011). 
1994-1997 early exploration 
Since the reform of tax-sharing system in 1994, financing capacity of local 
governments is significantly constrained. In order to meet the needs of local area and 
solve the funding problems, lots of the authorities were established to plan and manage 
the municipal construction to promote the economic development. 
1997-2008 development in an all-around way 
Facing the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the Chinese central government and 
local governments launched lots of mass infrastructure construction to stimulate 
economic development. Since 1998, China Development Bank advocated funding 
platforms, and issued loans for infrastructure construction projects. From then, LGFPs 
opened up a new phase(Zhao, 2011).  
 While LGFPs help to boost economic development, LGFPs were also 
responsible for substantial increases in local debt levels.  In 2006, NDRC (National 
Development and Reform Committee) and four other committees issued a notice calling 
for financial institutions to stop giving loans and credits to governments and local 
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governments to stop providing guarantee or implicit guarantee, which play an important 
role on constraining the scale of local governments’ debt.31 
2008-2010 explosions  
In order to deal with the financial crisis of 2007, China's central government 
launched 4 trillion yuan stimulus plan in 2008, which includes 2.8 trillion yuan matching 
funds raised by local governments. Since there was a large gap between the local 
governments’ revenues and the matching funds, the central bank and China Banking 
Regulatory Commission put forward some solutions including conditionally support local 
governments to establish the funding platforms, issue corporate bonds, medium-term 
notes and using other financing instruments to broaden the financing channels. Under the 
policy, plenty of funding platforms with different forms appeared. 32 
After 2010  
In order to control the risk of municipal debt, in June of 2010, China’s State 
Council issued ‘notice on strengthening management issues of local government 
financing platform’, calling for rectification of municipal debts by local governments. 
Moreover, in July, the China Treasury and other related committees put forward some 
implement measures.33    
31 For more information, please see: Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry 
of Construction, China People's Bank, China Banking Regulatory Commission. On strengthening macro-
control, remediation and standardize various bundled loans notice .2006 April. 
32People's Bank of China and China Banking Regulatory Commission. Guidance of further strengthening 
the credit structure adjustment to promote stable and rapid economic development (Yin Jian Fa [2009] 
No.92) .2009 March. 
33 Shanghai Institute research group of state-owned capital operation. Shanghai local government 
investment and financing platform for investment and financing mechanism’s innovation research [J]. 
Shanghai Administration Institute, May 2012 Volume 13, No. 3, P59-70. 
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After 2015 
In recent years, the Chinese central government is implementing an 
unprecedented budget reform, which is the first significant budget reform since 2000. 
Under the new budget law, since 2015, the country's 31 provincial-level administrative 
units and five municipalities can issue municipal bonds and do not have to rely on debt 
financing through LGFP, which is viewed as a significant change of budget law. 
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